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LEADERS, FOLLOWERS, AND FREE RIDERS:
THE COMMUNITY LAWYER'S DILEMMA
WHEN REPRESENTING NON-DEMOCRATIC
CLIENT ORGANIZATIONS
Michael Diamond* and Aaron O'Toole**
I. INTRODUCTION
Democratic participation in decision making is a recurring ideal
in many aspects of our society.' We are encouraged to vote for
candidates for public office;2 to voice our opinions to our repre-
sentatives on matters of societal importance;3 to become involved
in civic and social organizations;4 and to address common concerns
* Senior Academic and Policy Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center and
Director of Georgetown's Housing and Community Development Clinic. An earlier
version of this paper was presented at the 2001 annual meeting of the Law and Soci-
ety Association in Budapest. I would like to thank my friends and colleagues Frank
Munger, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, and Susan Bennett for their patience and persever-
ance in reading and commenting on several drafts and revisions of this article, their
insights and, especially, their encouragement. I would also like to acknowledge the
outstanding research help of William Phelps, Sekemia Mwonyonyi, and David Smith
without whose dedication and creativity this article would have suffered greatly
** Currently associated with the law firm of Klein Hornig in Washington, D.C.
Formerly, staff attorney in the Housing and Community Development Clinic, Ge-
orgetown University Law Center.
1. JOHN GASTIL, DEMOCRACY IN SMALL GROUPS 5 (1993) [hereinafter GASTIL,
SMALL GROUPS]. See generally JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH (rev.
ed., Yale Univ. 1998) (1990) (arguing that the American democratic ideology sets a
recurring pattern that calls the people to action). Cf JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, PAR-
TICIPATORY DEMOCRACY (1986) (noting that while citizen participation is enshrined
deeply in the culture of the United States, there is wide disagreement as to the forms
and extent that active citizen participation should play in governance system). For a
discussion of democratic participation in political theory see, for example, CAROLE
PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970) .
2. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR
A NEW AGE 134 (1984); ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 109-11
(1989); GASTIL, SMALL GROUPS, supra note 1, at 30 (1993) (stating that voting is the
only form of democratic talk that is essential because all other forms of deliberation
become virtually meaningless without the power to vote).
3. GASTIL, SMALL GROUPS, supra note 1, at 28-29 (2000); DANIEL C. KRAMER,
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 43-46 (1972). See generally IAN BUDGE, THE NEW
CHALLENGE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY (1996) (arguing for the feasibility of direct
mass involvement in policy-making and of having frequent popular votes with sup-
porting discussion); MORONE, supra note 1, at 33-73 (documenting citizen participa-
tion in American government throughout the nation's history).
4. SAUL D. ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS 99 (1946); BARBER, supra note
2, at 232; JOHN GASTIL, By POPULAR DEMAND 12 (2000) [hereinafter GASTIL, POPU-
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through interactive debate and conduct.5 There is often, however,
a considerable dissonance between the participatory ideal and the
reality. This is particularly true in reference to community groups
in low-income neighborhoods.6 There is a body of commentary
that values the importance of democratic participation over the
success of community groups in their legal struggles, but the litera-
ture suffers from a narrow and incomplete perspective.7 One im-
portant problem is that it emphasizes legal representation only in
the context of the democratic ideal and not with reference to the
needs of community groups as they actually exist and function.
Moreover, the literature fails to recognize that there are many
types of groups and that the ideal of democratic participation is not
a one-size-fits-all imperative that suits the goals and modus oper-
andi of each type.8
LAR DEMAND]. See generally BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF CITIZENS (Don Eberly ed.,
1994) (advocating a return to civil society, with an active citizenry, to revitalize Amer-
ican democratic institutions); MORONE, supra note 1 (tracing the development of rep-
resentative democracy in America and the ramifications of that development).
5. BARBER, supra note 2, at 151, 182-83; BUDGE, supra note 3, at 24; GASTIL,
POPULAR DEMAND supra note 4, at 112-36; see JAMES FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND
DELIBERATION 36-37 (1991) (commenting on the ideals of free & equal discussion);
GASTIL, SMALL GROUPS, supra note 1, at 5 (describing democracy as an open discus-
sion and the search for common ground); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why
Deliberative Democracy is Different, in DEMOCRACY 161 (Ellen Frankel Paul et. al.
eds., 2000) (arguing for a deliberative theory of democracy in which decisions and
policies are justified in a process of discussion among free citizens or their accounta-
ble representatives in order to make justifiable binding, collective decisions in the
midst of continuing moral conflict). For a philosophic treatment of the need for rea-
soned discourse as a basis for democratic action see, for example, JURGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THE-
ORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996).
6. See generally STUART G. COLE & MILDRED WEISE COLE, MINORITIES AND
THE AMERICAN PROMISE: THE CONFLICT OF PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE (1954) (stud-
ying the interrelationship between human relations, social change, and democracy);
S.J. MAKIELSKI, JR., BELEAGUERED MINORITIES (1973) (highlighting the conflicts
challenging the democratic way of life of the American people due to social change
and misunderstanding).
7. See GASTIL, SMALL GROUPS supra note 1, at 20 (warning that democratic deci-
sions cannot be reached by undemocratic processes by giving some group members
more authority than others or sacrificing the democratic rights of the minority to the
majority); GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 304 (1992) (referring derisively to those people who
believe that the complexity of social life demands experts and that "'citizen politi-
cians' should get out of the way").
8. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 659 (1987) (postulating that
traditional poverty lawyering echoes the domination of the powerful over the indi-
gent); Stephan Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA.
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This article will explore various aspects of the dissonance be-
tween the democratic ideal and the reality of groups in disen-
franchised and disempowered communities. We will discuss the
intersection of democracy and community action by examining the
sociology of groups and the social psychology of leaders and fol-
lowers. We will also examine the role of, and choices presented to,
an attorney working in a community and for local community
groups.
When a lawyer contemplates accepting or continuing the repre-
sentation of a group from a disempowered community, she must
consider much more than the legal merits of the particular matter
presented. Before taking on a client a lawyer might consider, for
example, whether the group is expressing legitimate community
needs.9 Often a lawyer will look for evidence of broad member
participation in the group's decision-making process.10 The latter
issue is particularly important when the lawyer identifies herself as
a lawyer who represents community interests in combatting pov-
erty and oppression.11
L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1992) [hereinafter Ellman, Client-Centeredness] (examining "the
conflicts between the themes of group participation and individual autonomy in the
context of public interest lawyers' representation of groups"); William H. Simon, Vi-
sions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 469 (1984) (contrasting
established legal practice as an ex-post actor to Critical Legal Studies vision of the
lawyer playing a proactive role); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79
YALE L. J. 1049, 1049 (1970) (explaining how practicing poverty law differs from the
traditional lawyering model).
9. The term "legitimate community needs" involves a complex interaction be-
tween the indefinite terms "legitimate" and "community." Here, we define "commu-
nity" broadly as a defined geographic area encompassing a preponderance of people
with similar ethnic, racial, cultural and economic backgrounds. The term "legitimate"
is also broadly defined to mean there is a recognizable and significant body of support
within the community for a position or set of positions. Thus, there may be several
alternative, even competing, legitimate positions within any community. See Michael
Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM.
RT's. L. REV. 67, 111-12 (2000) (noting how dissimilar the activist community lawyer's
challenges, goals and territory are from those of the traditional lawyer).
10. See Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1128-34.
11. See LoPEZ, supra note 7, at 32, 76-77 (describing lawyer's efforts to establish a
legalization program for immigrants and how rebellious lawyering work with groups
to effect social change); Diamond, supra note 9, at 73-77 (defining the community
lawyer as activist); Stephan Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 717,
733-53 (1987) (describing client-centered lawyering); Richard D. Marsico, Working
for Social Change and Preserving Client Autonomy: Is There a Role for "Facilitative"
Lawyering?, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 639, 639-40 (1995) (defining "facilitative" lawyer-
ing); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering
and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 699, 754-66 (1988) [hereainfter White, Lawyering and
Power] (describing three models of lawyering).
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The goal of participatory democracy must itself be subjected to
careful examination.1" In much of the commentary on community
lawyering, achieving the goal of democratic participation is consid-
ered to be a worthy object in its own right. 13 There is little or no
critical examination of whether such participation is a prerequisite
to meaningful social change or even whether participatory democ-
racy is always an aid to such change. The consideration of these
questions raises several subsidiary issues that also have received
scant attention in the literature. For example, what role should an
attorney play when she becomes aware of self-aggrandizing manip-
ulation or autocratic rule by a leader in a community group?
Should she attempt to foster democratic participation when it
might jeopardize substantive outcomes that are generally desired
by the membership? Do the rules of professional responsibility
provide adequate guidance to an attorney who observes such ma-
nipulation or autocracy? In essence, the question is whether the
maintenance of democratic participation must be part of the mis-
sion of a community lawyer.
12. In fact, the definition of democracy is itself subject to wide debate. A standard
definition is "government by the people exercised either directly or through elected
representatives." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000). Jane Man-
sbridge has defined a democratic community as:
[O]ne that makes decisions in ways that respect the fundamental equality of
each citizen, both as a participant in deliberation and as the bearer of poten-
tially equal power in decisions. The appropriate forms of democracy differ
depending on the degree of common interest in the polity. The stronger the
community, the less useful are aggressive democratic forms like majority
rule, developed to handle fundamentally conflicting interests, and the more
useful are deliberative democratic forms developed to promote mutual ac-
commodations and agreement.
Jane Mansbridge, Feminism and Democratic Community, in DEMOCRATIC COMMU-
NITY 340-41 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993). Mansbridge has also con-
nected democracy to coercion. "In democracies, we must use power to get things
done. By power, I mean coercion-causing others to do what they would not other-
wise do by threat of sanction or the use of force." Jane Mansbridge, Using Poweri
Fighting Power, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 53, 53 (1994). Dorf and Sabel take a more prag-
matic approach. They suggest "a new model of institutionalized democratic delibera-
tion that responds to the conditions of modem life." Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283
(1998). They find that "[d]emocracy was the method for reflecting on the connection
of means to ends in social activity. Specifically, for Dewey, it was a method for identi-
fying and correcting through public debate and action the unintended consequences
of coordination among private actors." Id. at 286.
13. See Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1147 (noting that "even if
each individual knows his or her mind it remains necessary for the group to come to a
collective decision. To make a collective decision requires a collective decisionmaking
method, but there is no method that infallibly reflects yet does not influence the pref-
erences of the voters").
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Our conclusion is that the value of participatory democracy is
not a given. Rather, it is a function of the nature and goals of a
particular group at a particular time and is not a sine qua non of
group representation. Lawyers may recognize the legitimacy of
groups and their leaders even in the absence of democratic partici-
pation. They need not demand, encourage or expect such partici-
pation as a prerequisite for beginning or continuing the
representation. Regardless of the presence of a participatory pro-
cess, there are also issues of whether the lawyer must be concerned
about discovered manipulation or self-aggrandizement by a group's
leaders and whether she must confront such behavior on behalf of
the group. Unfortunately, the Model Rules of Professional Re-
sponsibility' 4 provide little-to-no guidance on how a lawyer should
act in such situations.
Because the nature of an association and the relationship be-
tween its members and leaders will have a significant effect on a
lawyer's role in representing it, we examine some of the concepts
surrounding the formation and functioning of groups. The remain-
der of Part I will describe the ideal of democratic participation and
juxtapose it against two narratives of community group interac-
tions. Part II explores group and organization theory. It will ex-
amine what differentiates an aggregation of individuals from a
group and will discuss concepts of followership and free riding.
Part III will examine the problems these issues present to a lawyer
dedicated to community representation. We will survey the ex-
isting legal literature on the relationship of lawyers to groups and
point out the gaps in the analyses. We will also examine the ethical
considerations relevant to group representation and identify the
significant shortcomings of the Model Rules as they pertain to a
community group practice. In Part IV, we lay the foundation for a
new ethic of group representation for the community lawyer, one
that distinguishes between issues of client autonomy as an end and
substantive changes in physical conditions and power relationships
in communities. This ethic also takes into account the characteris-
tics of groups and their leaders, and addresses the relationship of
democratic participation to legal representation in the community
context.
14. See ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1998). While Model Rule 1.13
does address a lawyer's responsibilities in the representation of a group client, in Part
III, we will discuss its limited applicability to the representation of many community
groups.
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A. The Idealized Vision
The embodiment of an effective community group involves peo-
ple who come together, either spontaneously or at the urging of an
organizer, 15 in a participatory collaboration,16 to address injustices
its members face in common. 17 The resulting interaction should
foment both new ideas and a sense of personal stake in the process
and in the outcome. Group members discuss their common con-
cerns, educate themselves about the issues and decide on appropri-
ate action.'8 The ideal envisions leadership emerging from among
the participants with the leaders being recognized as such by an
informed and active membership.' 9 The leaders would speak for
the group and help it to shape its purposes and activities.20 The
membership might also seek the involvement of outsiders to assist
them in their development and help to create and implement strat-
egies to combat the problems that brought them together.
Unfortunately, community groups in poor communities rarely
develop in this manner. 21 While many groups coalesce around per-
ceived problems and evolve into effective and democratic organi-
zations, there are also many cases in which groups and their
activities are exploited by their apparent leaders, by adversaries,
occasionally by allies and sometimes by group members them-
selves.22 In discussing democracy and outcomes, we will examine
15. See ALINSKY, supra note 4, at 77-78 (noting that in order to have an organiza-
tion or program that reflects "the people's" wish, one must first have an organization
through which the program can be developed because the people's program is the
"product of one person, five persons, a church, a labor union, a business group, a
social agency, or a political club; in short, a program which can be traced to one or
two persons or institutions, but never to the people").
16. LoPEZ, supra note 7, at 38; see ALINSKY, supra note 4, at 109-10 (relating the
synergist effect of inclusion rather than exclusion).
17. LoPEZ, supra note 7, at 38.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 30-31 (describing how a community lawyer lives, and therefore is
intimately attuned with the problems in the community); see also ALINSKY, supra note
4, at 102 (telling the consequences of a community organizer ignoring local mores).
20. LOPEZ, supra note 7, at 32.
21. See Ellmann, Client-Centerendess, supra note 8, at 1154 (noting that groups
that represent poor and disadvantaged groups have few alternatives-particularly if
the group further subdivides into factions; consequently, they are "under considerable
pressure to find a solution within the parameters of continued membership in the
group").
22. See Lucie E. White, Lawyering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 25 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 813, 825 (1998). White explains:
There is always going to be tension, in community-based work that aspires to
be both participatory and emancipatory, between the directive role that an
organizer, lawyer, leader, or teacher, must play to get the work going and
keep it on track, and the teacher's aspiration to draw out, rather than dic-
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the nature of groups and of democratic participation, 23 the mean-
ing and efficacy of group leadership and the issues of followership,
free riding and exploitation. 24 We will explore the tensions be-
tween democratic participation and successful outcomes 25 and the
ethical and political dilemma of a lawyer who represents a group
with a non-democratic or exploitive leadership. 26 In some cases,
the autocracy or exploitation may, nevertheless, lead to the
achievement of the group's purposes.27 In other cases, it merely
serves the self-aggrandizing purposes of the leader at the expense
of the membership and of the community.28
B. Setting the Stage
Much of the current literature on community lawyering both le-
gal and non-legal, focuses on the relationship between law and op-
pression, on the role of leaders and on the process of group goal
setting and decision making. 29 Some of the literature focuses on
the role of lawyers who represent community groups involved in
such struggles, emphasizing the nature of the lawyer-client rela-
tate, the group's own voices. William Simon has referred to this paradox as
"the dark secret" of community-based poverty lawyering. You need power-
ful leadership to get a community-based group together and to help it under-
take meaningful action. Yet with that leadership comes the obvious risks of
domination and exploitation.
Id. (citing to William Simon, The Dark Secret of Community Based Lawyering: A
Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1102-04 (1994)).
23. See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
24. See discussion infra Part II.C.
25. See discussion infra Part II.D.
26. See discussion infra Part III.
27. See discussion infra Part III.A.
28. See discussion infra Part III.A.
29. See e.g. Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1146-48 (explaining the
difficulties of collective decision making). For a survey of the scholarship on the role
of lawyers in facilitating group decision making see GASTIL, SMALL GROUPS, supra
note 1; LOPEZ, supra note 7; Christina Z. Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community
Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 229 (2000); Diamond,
supra note 9; Zenobia Lai, et. al., The Lessons of the Parcel C Struggle: Reflections on
Community Lawyering, 6 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (2000); John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing
the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (1992); Nancy Morawetz,
Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO STATE L. J. 1 (1993); White,
Lawyering and Power, supra note 11; Melanie D. Acevedo, Note, Client-Choices,
Community Values: Why Faith-Based Legal Services Providers Are Good for Poverty
Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1491 (2002).
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tionship.30 The questions with which we began this essay, however,
have received little attention.
Consider the following two situations,3' one concerning an ad
hoc group and the other concerning an institutional group. In each
case, one individual dominates the group but the nature of the
dominance, and its results, differ in each situation. These differ-
ences highlights some of the important questions we hope to
address.
A sevety-five-unit apartment building has long been occupied
by low-income residents, most of whom are immigrants, some of
whom are undocumented, and many of whom do not speak En-
glish. The building is in a neighborhood that has been rapidly
gentrifying and the owner wants to sell it to someone who will
likely convert it to luxury apartments or to a condominium. In
furtherance of this goal, the owner has not re-rented apartments
that have become vacant when a tenant moved out and has not
made improvements to the building. Maintenance has been cut
to the bare minimum necessary to preserve habitability. The te-
nants had been organized by a now-deceased resident who led
them in initiating a rent strike and in filing various administra-
tive proceedings against the owner, most of which were con-
ducted pro se. The owner has instituted landlord/tenant actions
against the tenants and has sought permission from the local
rent-control agency to evict the tenants due to the owner's de-
sire either to substantially renovate the building himself or to
sell it to someone who will renovate it. The struggle has contin-
ued with several ebbs and flows for a considerable period and
multiple pieces of litigation were proceeding simultaneously.
The possibility of a settlement emerged and a judge, seeking a
solution to the seemingly endless litigation, suggested to the
group that they retain counsel to help negotiate a settlement.
30. For a survey of the scholarship discussing the ethical, interpersonal, and politi-
cal aspects of the attorney-client relationship, see, for example DOUGLAS E. ROSEN-
THAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974) (discussing the interpersonal
aspects of the attorney-client relationship); William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, En-
actments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interac-
tions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992) (addressing the political aspects of the
attorney-client relationship); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foun-
dations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Bruce A. Green,
Rationing Lawyers: Ethical and Professional Issues in the Delivery of Legal Services to
Low-Income Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1713 (1999); Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal
Professionalism: Do Ethical Rules Require Zealous Representation for Poor People?, 8
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 97 (1995).
31. The narratives we present here have been derived from actual cases with
which we either have been involved or been aware. The names of the participants and
some of the facts have been modified to preserve their anonymity.
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The judge, with the group's consent, contacted a local attorney
experienced in housing finance and development to see if she
would be willing to speak to the residents. The judge warned
the attorney that the current leader of the group (the daughter
of the deceased founder) was a very difficult client and that
three previous attorneys had withdrawn from representing the
group because of her. Nevertheless, the attorney, after meeting
with the group (in the presence of interpreters of four different
languages), agreed to take on the limited task of negotiating a
settlement that would satisfy the resident's wishes. The current
group leader, whom we shall call "Arabella," tells the attorney
that the thirty-one remaining residents are willing to vacate but
want a significant amount of cash, a period of free rent while
they seek other housing accommodations, and assistance from
the owner in finding such accommodations.
Arabella is herself an immigrant but with significantly more
education and financial means than the other residents. She is
intelligent, analytical and professes total commitment to the
well-being of the residents. Arabella assumed the leadership
position several years ago, after her father's death.
It is unclear whether the residents actively decided to place
Arabella in the leadership position but there did not seem to be
any serious opposition to her leadership. In fact, there did not
seem to be any other member of the group who even desired the
role. Arabella seemed to perform all of group's tasks and made
all of its decisions without any known dissent from group mem-
bers. They seemed all too willing to let Arabella continue to act
as she had.
A settlement was eventually reached after a lengthy negotia-
tion in which Arabella played a part. It provided, among other
things, for a significant sum to be distributed among the re-
sidents according to a two step process: the first step involved a
formula that was incorporated in the settlement agreement; the
second step permitted the residents association to make an allo-
cation of the balance of the funds. When the residents' alloca-
tion (which was prepared by Arabella) was presented to the
group's attorney, the attorney was shocked to see that Arabella
had allocated to herself a bonus of $114,000 (or 15% of the total
funds available) in addition to her otherwise allocated share of
the proceeds. Her bonus reduced each resident's share by an
average of $3,500.
This story raises important, often submerged, issues such as
whether the group obtained better results with Arabella's now ap-
parent autocratic and manipulative leadership than it would have
with a more democratic, participatory procedure. This assumes the
2004] 489
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membership was capable and willing to initiate and maintain such
procedures. A more basic question is whether this was a group at
all or merely an aggregate of individuals.32 In either case, one
could ask how the lawyer should have related to the interactions
between Arabella and the residents.
A second case presents related problems but in a different
context.
In the Winter of 1989, tenants in a building received notices that
the owner intended to sell it. Under local law, the tenants had
the first right to purchase the building. A group of tenants exer-
cised that right and with the assistance of a local nonprofit or-
ganization, the residents entered into a contract to purchase the
building, put together the necessary financing, and ultimately
acquired the building through a cooperative housing association
formed by the tenants. Most tenants became members of the
cooperative and each member had the right to live in one of the
units in the building.
Upon forming the cooperative association, one of the members'
first actions was to elect a board of directors. Several members
competed for the limited number of directorships, including Ms.
Johnson. For more than ten years prior to the tenants' purchase
of the building, Ms. Johnson had been the resident manager, an
employee of the former owner. During her tenure in that posi-
tion, many of the tenants came to dislike her. She was un-
friendly and often failed to respond to the requests and
complaints of residents. On more than one occasion, she
threatened to call the INS to report tenants she thought were
undocumented immigrants. Not surprisingly, Ms. Johnson was
not elected to the board.
Over the next few years, the cooperative ran relatively
smoothly. The Board met regularly and effectively managed the
property. Annual membership meetings were well attended and
residents volunteered for the various committees organized to
maintain the cooperative. Ms. Johnson, somewhat embittered
by her defeat in the Board election, did nothing more than sit
quietly at membership meetings.
As with any building, old residents left and new residents moved
in. After several years, few of the households that had lived in
the building prior to its conversion remained and none of the
original board members remained. At that year's annual mem-
32. The question is basic because both the governance structure of a group can be
very different from that of a mere aggregation (leaving the lawyer with dissimilar
political concerns) and because the ethical responsibilities of a lawyer to a group dif-
fer from those of a lawyer to a set of related, but individual, clients.
490
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bership meeting, Ms. Johnson re-ran for director and she won.
At its first organizational meeting, the new board elected Ms.
Johnson president of the cooperative.
Not long after securing her post, Ms. Johnson went to several of
the cooperative members with a proposed resolution to amend
the bylaws. The amendment would increase the term of a direc-
tor from two years to seven years. She did not provide notice of
the proposed change to all of the members and no meetings
were held to discuss the change. Nonetheless, a majority of the
members signed the resolution approving the amendment. Ms.
Johnson then forwarded the amendment to the cooperative's at-
torney, who included it in the file without questioning it.
During her presidency, several more board members moved out,
board meetings became less frequent and less well attended, and
Ms. Johnson increasingly took control of the affairs of the build-
ing. Eventually the cooperative's bank requested the board's
minutes. Having nothing to show them, Ms. Johnson sought vol-
unteers to fill the vacated slots on the board. Several members
agreed, and for a while meetings were held regularly. While Ms.
Johnson would permit the other board members to speak at the
meetings, she would then disregarded their views and took
whatever action she desired. For example, several of the new
board members raised the issue of replacing the management
company because of its poor performance: units remained va-
cant for long periods of time while individuals applying for units
were being told that there were no units available; the board did
not receive reports and budgets in a timely manner; and repairs
and maintenance were performed slowly, poorly, or not at all.
Under such autocratic conditions, board members quickly be-
came discouraged and stopped attending meetings. Board
meetings, which were open to all members of the cooperative,
rarely had more than two people in attendance. Over the past
three years, various members have sporadically requested that
the cooperative hold elections for directors. Each time Ms.
Johnson has ignored the request, usually with the backing of a
few supportive members. Trying a different approach, one
board member contacted an outside organizer and arranged for
a meeting to discuss how the members of the cooperative could
regain control of their building. Only three people showed up.
While it seems clear that the cooperative's attorney failed in his
most basic duties to the client,33 the question remains as to what
33. At the very least, the attorney should have advised the cooperative's board of
both the procedural and substantive illegality of Ms. Johnson's proposed by-law
amendment. The more difficult question, one that we will address later in this article,
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the attorney should have done in this situation. How should the
attorney react to a group that seems disinterested, without hope, or
that is intimidated into inaction by a rogue leader? Should the re-
sult depend on the substantive progress of the project on which the
group embarked or is there another criterion on which an attorney
should determine the scope of her role? In either case, how does
an attorney make such an appraisal? These are questions to which
we will return in Part IV of this article.
For now, we simply wish to point out some of the significant dif-
ferences between the associations in the two narratives. An impor-
tant distinction is that the Arabella narrative involves a group that
evolved into an one-shot group. Its goals evolved from long-term
improvements in living conditions in the building (where residents
would remain) to securing a one-time payment for departing. The
cooperative, on the other hand, involved the goals of maintaining
resident-owned, affordable housing in decent condition as well as
involving the members of the cooperative in a collaborative pro-
cess of interaction and personal growth. The group expected to
remain together for the long term.
The differences in the goals of the associations suggest a differ-
ence in the form of interaction and governance they might adopt
and also might affect the way in which an attorney relates to the
organization. We will address the differences in structure and in-
teraction in Part III and the implications of those differences in
Part IV.
H. THE NATURE OF GROUPS
What distinguishes a "group" from merely an aggregate of indi-
viduals, from a crowd, or from a mob? Need there be interaction
or interdependence among the individuals? Need there be a
leader, a set of goals, a doctrine, or creed? Social scientists have
proposed various definitions for the notion of a group and have
identified several, occasionally conflicting, attributes necessary for
an aggregation to qualify as a group.34 The distinctions can have
is whether the attorney took too narrow a view of his role in representing the
cooperative.
34. Social scientists have subdivided groups into several different types, each of
which with its own characteristics. For a survey of various definitions of groups, see,
for example, NICHOLAS ABERCROMBIE, ET. AL., THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF SOCI-
OLOGY (4th ed. 2001); CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: A
STUDY OF THE LARGER MIND (1909); HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD, DICTIONARY OF
SOCIOLOGY (1944); THOMAS FORD HOULT, DICTIONARY OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY
(1969); G. DUNCAN MITCHELL, A HUNDRED YEARS OF SOCIOLOGY (1968); EDWARD
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serious implications for an attorney in the nature of her representa-
tion and in the ethical considerations that apply to that representa-
tion. In a community context, these distinctions can also take on
political implications for the lawyer.
In this section, we will consider some of the more influential def-
initions of the term "group" and examine some of the attributes
associated with them. We will also look at issues of leadership, fol-
lowership and democratic participation in groups and apply our ob-
servations to community groups in the preceding examples in Part
I of this essay. Then we will examine the lawyer's role and respon-
sibilities when representing groups and aggregates of individuals.
Finally, we will speculate about issues of legitimacy and group rep-
resentation of community goals.35
Our interpretation of the lawyer's role involves the lawyer help-
ing to create and maintain community groups to combat oppres-
sion. A large body of literature reflects on the need for
organization and political action in this struggle.36 We think of the
lawyer as an activist and a participant in these activities and in the
groups that she represents. We view the lawyer's role as seeking
solutions to problems wherever the solutions may be found. Thus
the role of the lawyer, and the area in which the lawyer should
function, is quite expansive. Of course, not all clients or all groups
are interested in or receptive to this type of lawyering. The ques-
tion then arises of how a lawyer should collaborate with such
groups. We elaborate on this question in Part IV.
BYRON REUTER, HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY (1941); SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HAND-
BOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES (E. Tory Higgins & Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1996);
GEORGE A. THEODORSON & ACHILLES G. THEODORSON, A MODERN DICTIONARY
OF SOCIOLOGY (1969).
35. In the interest of full disclosure, we thought it appropriate to set out our initial
biases. We believe that the law, and litigation in particular, is a necessary, yet clearly
insufficient, element of community change and empowerment. Lawyers who focus
primarily on the creation or enforcement of rights often lose the opportunity to estab-
lish lasting institutions that can aggregate and wield power in the ongoing struggle for
political and economic equality. Having taken this position, we suggest a redefinition
of the role of public interest or community lawyers for whom litigation has historically
been a mainstay of their endeavor.
36. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 9; Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights
Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603
(1989); Wexler, supra note 8; Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field?:
On Mapping the Paths From Rhetoric To Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994).
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A. A Group by Any Other Name
Many scholars have studied, and often disagreed, about the na-
ture, or even the existence, of groups.37 Of those who recognize
their existence,38 the consensus is that there is no consensus. 39
There is agreement that the term has been applied to a number of
very different combinations. For example, some scholars differen-
tiate between formal and informal groups.40 Formal groups are
often defined as those with established hierarchies, written proce-
dures and that are, generally, of large size.41 Informal groups are
typically smaller with unwritten procedures. 42 They are established
by the members themselves, are more flexible, and change often.43
Other scholars distinguish between primary and secondary
groups.4 Charles Horton Cooley has defined primary groups as
"those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and coop-
eration. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they
are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the
individual. 45
37. Some scholars characterize a group broadly, as a generally inclusive term; a
group is nothing more than two or more individuals associated with each other that
must be thought of together. See ABERCOMBIE, ET AL., supra note 34, at 108; REUTER,
supra note 34, at 121 (offering different definitions of "group" all of which refer to
more than one individual). Other scholars characterize a group more narrowly, re-
quiring an established pattern of psychological interaction, reciprocal communication,
some degree of interdependence and a type of collective behavior. DORWIN CART-
WRIGHT & ALVIN ZANDER, GROUP DYNAMICS: RESEARCH AND THEORY 46-48 (3d
ed. 1968); FAIRCHILD, supra note 34, at 133-37; HOULT supra note 34, at 147-48; THE-
ODORSON & THEODORSON, supra note 34, at 176. Still other scholars do not accept
the existence of groups; they argue that no group has an identity other than the com-
posite of the individuals who have come together. FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 4 (1924) (asserting that "[t]here is no psychology of groups which is not
essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals").
38. There is widespread agreement among scholars that the aggregation of indi-
viduals can create a group as long as there is interdependence among its members;
this interdependence is a "key criterion distinguishing groups from other social aggre-
gates." John Levine & Leigh Thompson, Conflict in Groups, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
745 (E. Tory Higgens & Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1996).
39. Id. (stating that "[m]any definitions of groups have been offered over the
years, and no single definition has achieved universal acceptance") (citations
omitted).
40. See THEODORSON & THEODORSON, supra note 34, at 177; STEPHEN WILSON,
INFORMAL GROUPS: AN INTRODUCTION 17 (1978).
41. See THEODORSON & THEODORSON, supra note 34, at 177.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 178-79.
44. See COOLEY, supra note 34, at 23-31.
45. See WILSON, supra note 40, at 18 (citing COOLEY, supra note 34, at 23). Wil-
son has criticized this definition because many informal, face-to-face groups lack the
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Still others recognize groups through the participants' self-identi-
fication as members.46 Ruppert Brown, for example, after examin-
ing several defining criteria, has suggested "a group exists when
two or more people define themselves as members of it and when
its existence is recognized by at least one other. 47
Peter Hartley has attempted to categorize the elements that vari-
ous scholars have used in defining groups.48 After reviewing the
literature, he identified four factors around which groups com-
monly have been defined. The factors are:
* the common fate of the members
* the social structure of the group
* the nature of the interaction between members
* the fact that members categorize themselves as members49
Even among smaller, informal, primary groups, there is consider-
able variation in the kinds of groups that have been recognized.
Henri Tajfel and Colin Fraser have identified four types of small
groups: family groups, friendship groups, work groups and labora-
tory groups.50 These groups can be further categorized as volun-
tary, where the members chose to be associated, or compulsory,
where circumstances have thrust members together, more or less
without their volition (e.g. family groups, employee work groups,
etc.). 51
In applying Tajfel and Fraser's classifications, the community
lawyer will be interested primarily in the voluntary work group.
Work groups aim to achieve certain goals or to rectify certain
problems.5" They are the kinds of groups that often seek assistance
from a lawyer and they are also the type for which a lawyer could
be most helpful.
The associations we have described fit many of the characteris-
tics of groups. For example, Arabella's group is a voluntary, pri-
mary, work group. It is informal even though it has certain formal
sense of "we-ness" that Cooley called for and, in fact, display a very low sense of "we-
ness."
46. RUPPERT BROWN, GROUP PROCESSES: DYNAMICS WITHIN AND BETWEEN
GROUPS 2 (1988).
47. Id. at 2-3.
48. See PETER HARTLEY, GROUP COMMUNICATION 20 (1997).
49. Id..
50. HENRI TAJFEL & COLIN FRASER, INTRODUCING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 178-83
(1978), discussed in HARTLEY, supra note 48, at 25-26.
51. Ann E. Chudd, Nonvoluntary Social Groups, in GROUPS & GROUP RIGHTS 58
(Leslie Francis et. al. eds., 2001).
52. See TAJFEL & FRASER, supra note 50, at 180 (commenting that work groups'
major goals are instrumental or task oriented).
2004]
496 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
characteristics such as bylaws. Although there are some elements
of self-identification among the members, they are relatively weak.
Nonetheless, the building owner and the court see the residents as
a group. The housing cooperative is also a voluntary, primary,
work group. It is, however, much more formal than Arabella's.
Members self-identify as part of a group and much of the outside
world see them that way as well. In our example, the autocratic
leadership weakened the self-identification to the point that many
residents saw themselves simply as tenants rather than as members
of a cooperative.
A lawyer's ability to help these types of groups depends, to a
great extent, on the nature and dynamic of the group. The dy-
namic, in turn, depends on the nature of the group's leadership and
followership.5 3 Are the goals articulated by the leadership sup-
ported by the membership? Is there a procedure by which mem-
ber's views are transmitted to the leaders of the group? Do the
leaders accurately transmit the group's desires to the attorney? We
will examine these and similar issues in the next sections.
B. Degrees of Groupness
Tajfel and Fraser and others have talked in terms of the degree
of groupness present in an aggregation of individuals. 4 The infer-
ence is that not all groups will exhibit all of the attributes of group-
ness at any particular time and the attribute levels will vary over
time. Ruppert Brown has asserted that the common factor "to
many, if not all" groups is interdependence.55 He distinguishes be-
53. Followership describes a fluctuating equilibrium in the relationship between a
group's leader and its members. It suggests an ongoing tension: the followers commu-
nicate their needs and the leader responds. In the balance are both the achievement
of group goals and the maintenance of control by the leaders. For a discussion of
followership, see, for example, Kingsley R. Browne, Women at War: An Evolutionary
Perspective, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 51, 133-42 (2001); Andrew Fenton Cooper et al., Bound
to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict, 106 POL. SCI. Q. 391
(1991).
54. Tajfel & Fraser argue that there are 6 major characteristics identified with
groups: 1) interaction among members; 2) perception by members of their member-
ship; 3) having certain goals or purposes; 4) having group specific norms; 5) differenti-
ated roles among members; and 6) affective relations among members. These factors
will be present, to one degree or another, in all groups. By plotting these factors on a
graph, one could discern the profile of a particular group and compare degrees of
groupness across different groups. See TAJFEL & FRASER, supra note 50, at 177-78.
More generally, for the difference between an aggregation or collectivity and a group,
see FAIRCHILD, supra note 34, at 7, 133; HOULT, supra note 34, at 69, 147-48; REUTER,
supra note 34, at 82, 121; THEODORSON & THEODORSON, supra note 34, at 60, 176.
55. BROWN, supra note 46, at 27.
COMMUNITY LAWYER'S DILEMMA
tween interdependence of fate, and interdependence of task.56 Inter-
dependence of fate is often arbitrary. In what is now an eerily
compelling example, Brown describes a situation of passengers on
a commercial airplane. 57 There is little interaction among them
and their presence on the flight is random. If the plane were to be
hijacked, however, the passengers would be transformed into hos-
tages; their fate would be bound closely together. They would be
transformed into a group. 8
Brown finds interdependence of fate to be the "weakest form of
interdependence. 59 Interdependence of task is much more impor-
tant to group process. It involves common goals among members
and implies the division of tasks within the group. Each member's
successful completion of her task impacts the ability of other mem-
bers to complete their tasks and the group to achieve its goals.
60
The division of tasks can lead to cooperation or competition among
group members. It also has pertinence for how members feel
about their membership and about themselves.
Another way of looking at these issues is to distinguish between
group content and group process.61 Group content is comprised of
group tasks and activities while group process refers to how the
group operates and how the members relate to it and to each
other.62 R.F. Bales, a post-war psychologist, discusses this issue by
identifying instrumental, or task related, activity and expressive, or
56. Id. at 28. Brown here draws on the work of Lewin and others in which they
assert that groups come into existence not because members are similar to one an-
other but because they recognize that their fate depends upon the fate of the group as
a whole.
57. Id. One need only recall the passengers on American Airlines Flight 11 and
United Airlines Flight 175 that crashed into the World Trade Center towers, or Amer-
ican Flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, for examples of
interdependence of fate. Based on news reports, one could also look at United Flight
93 that crashed 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where passengers ac-
ted on September 11, to divert the plane from its intended target, or American Air-
lines Flight 63 en route from Paris to Miami on which passengers acted in concert to
subdue Richard Reid before he was allegedly able to detonate explosives on the
plane, to understand how the interdependence of fate can lead to an interdependence
of task. See Tim Golden, A Day of Terror: The Operation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001,
at A13 (listing airline flights that were hijacked on September 11, 2001); Donald G.
McNeil, Jr., A Nation Challenged: The Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2001, at B5
(identifying Reid's flight).
58. BROWN, supra note 46, at 28.
59. Id. at 30.
60. Id.
61. HARTLEY, supra note 48, at 24.
62. Id.
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emotional or personal, behavior in small groups.63 His starting
point in discussing group behavior is that small groups are created
to achieve some task and that their activity is directed toward that
end.64 In pursuing instrumental goals, however, disagreements
among members may threaten the functioning of the group.65
These may be strategic differences, differences in underlying val-
ues, or competition over roles and power. Bales suggests that the
tensions caused by these differences may be mitigated by expres-
sive behavior,66 that is, some personal action, such as a display of
anger or laughter or rejection of a member or members in the
group. He theorizes that this leads the group towards regaining
equilibrium in order to continue pursuing its ultimate goal. 67 Thus,
expressive goals are often supplementary to, and supportive of, in-
strumental ones. 68 Of course, the group leadership plays a signifi-
cant role in giving the group its personality and in determining the
nature of its instrumental and expressive activities.69 We turn now
to an examination of the nature of leadership and of its corollary,
followership.
C. You Weren't Born to Follow
Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this
world have the spirit and power of philosophy . . . and those
63. See R. F. BALES, INTERACTION PROCESS ANALYSIS: A METHOD FOR THE
STUDY OF SMALL GROUPS 51 (1950) (differentiating between expressive and instru-
mental acts).
64. Id. at 53; see also BROWN, supra note 46, at 28 (noting that a collection of
people become a group when they realize that their fates are intertwined).
65. BALES, supra note 63, at 54-55.
66. Id. at 55.
67. Id.
68. See id. (explaining that expressive actions are the means to restoring the group
and permitting it to pursue an instrumental goal). The concepts of instrumental and
expressive goals are salient in other situations. For example, several commentators,
particularly in social work and some lawyers, see expressive goals as equal to or, in
some cases, paramount to, instrumental ones. If this viewpoint is valid, it has major
implications for the role of lawyers who represent community groups. See, e.g., EI-
LEEN KENNEDY-MOORE & JEANNE C. WATSON, EXPRESSING EMOTION: MYTHS, RE-
ALITIES AND THERAPEUTIC STRATEGIES 92-98 (1999) (exploring the link between
emotional expression and goals); David A. Binder et. al., A Client-Centered Ap-
proach, 35 N.Y.L. SCHOOL L. REV 29, 34-35 (1990) (discussing that client satisfaction
is the goal of representation and the client's goals may differ depending on the client's
situation); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refine-
ment, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 591-94 (1990) (commenting on Binder & Price's ap-
proach); Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1123.
69. John R.P. French, Group Productivity, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN:
RESEARCH IN HUMAN RELATIONS 48 (Harold Guetzkow ed., 1951).
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commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the
other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest
from their evils,-no, nor the human race ... and then only will
this our State have a possibility, of life and behold the light of
day.7
0
Strong leaders make weak people.71
The nature of a group, its goals and processes, often reflects the
nature of its leadership.72 Because a lawyer generally relates to a
group through its leaders, the nature of that leadership necessarily
affects the extent and scope of the lawyer's representation. It also
affects the lawyer's relationship with a group. We will explore this
relationship and will examine the difficult questions of group legiti-
macy, particularly in reference to the degree of groupness dis-
played by a particular group. We will also examine the nature of
the group's goals and its activities in pursuing those goals.
Leadership has long been the subject of inquiry and study.73 Al-
though there is greater support for the desirability of leadership
than suggested by Zapata, there is not agreement on a single defi-
nition of the term.74 Today, a common understanding is that lead-
70. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC Book V, in PORTABLE PLATO 492 (Scott Buchanan ed.,
Benjamin Jowett trans., Penguin Books 1948).
71. Emiliano Zapata, quoted in Benjamin R. Barber, Neither Leaders nor Follow-
ers: Citizenship Under Strong Democracy, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES MAC-
GREGOR BURNS (Michael R. Beschloss & Thomas E. Cronin eds., 1989).
72. See, e.g., CARTWRIGHT & ZANDER, supra note 37, at 304; DONELSON R. FOR-
SYTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO GROUP DYMANICS 40-42 (1983); GROUPS DECISION
MAKING 493 (Herman Brandstaetter et. al. eds., 1982); JOSEPH E. McGRATH,
GROUPS: INTERACTION AND PERFORMANCE 254-56 (1984); Browne, supra note 53, at
137 (discussing different leadership styles in relation to gender and the group type).
73. See THOMAS GORDON, GROUP CENTERED LEADERSHIP 17 (1965).
74. See, e.g., HARTLEY, supra note 48, at 88 (stating that "we still do not have a
definitive account of what it means to be an effective leader across a wide range of
situations") For a discussion of leadership literature see id. at 88-96. Early research
on leadership was concerned with identifying the characteristics of leaders (trait ap-
proach). Commonly invoked traits for leadership were high morale; high productivity;
popularity; equalitarianism; and authoritarianism. CARTWRIGHT & ZANDER, supra
note 37, at 303. Disappointment with the trait approach has led to a more situational
approach, which stresses the characteristics of the group and the situation in which
leadership exists. Under this approach, leadership is viewed as the performance of
those acts that help the group achieve its preferred outcomes (group functions). More
specifically, leadership consists of: 1) aid in setting group goals; 2) moving the group
toward its goal; 3) improving the quality of interactions among the members; 4) build-
ing the cohesiveness of the group; and 5) making resources available to the group.
See id. at 304-06. Other scholars like Carroll L. Shartle have identified 5 general
definitions of "leader" that have appeared in literature: 1) one who exercises positive
influence acts upon others; 2) one who exercises more important positive influence
acts than any other member of the group; 3) one who exercises the most influence in
setting or achieving goals of the group; 4) one elected by the group to serve as leader;
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ership is closely tied to the factual situations in which it arises.75
This represents a change from earlier views which were tied to in-
born or learned personal characteristics or traits of leaders.76 In
fact, current theory often assesses leadership as a fluid process that
is tied not only to the actions and abilities of the leader but also to
the needs and actions of the followers.
7 7
1. Recognizing Leadership
First, it is important to note that scholars almost universally
viewed leadership within the group context. 7  According to Gita
De Souza and Howard Klein, leadership's main purpose is to or-
ganize groups and direct them towards their goals. 79 James Mac-
Gregor Burns argues that leaders also help to shape the "motives
and values and goals of followers through the vital teaching role of
leadership."8 " These definitions leave us, however, with questions
of how one becomes a leader and, once one has done so, which
methods and techniques should be utilized to be a successful
leader. One may also inquire about the nature of authority and the
attendant problems associated with the misuse of that authority.
and 5) one in an office or position of apparently high influence potential. Carroll L.
Shartle, Studies in Naval Leadership, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN: RESEARCH
IN HUMAN RELATIONS 121-22 (Harold Guetzkow ed., 1951).
75. See CARTWRIGHT & ZANDER, supra note 37, at 302-04 (discussing the shift
from trait theory to a more situational understanding of leadership).
76. Id; see also GORDON, supra note 73, at 47-48 (explaining the shift in belief that
the origin of a good leader depends not on heredity, nor even on traits acquired
through "experience, education, and special training," but that different types of
groups require different kinds of leadership).
77. See, e.g., CARTWRIGHT & ZANDER, supra note 37, at 302-04; JAMES MAC-
GREGOR BURNS, LEADERSHIP 425 (1978). Burns states that "[l]eadership is the recip-
rocal process of mobilizing, by persons with certain motives and values, various
economic, political, and other resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in
order to realize goals independently or mutually held by both leaders and followers."
Id. (emphasis added); see also Robert G. Lord et al., Understanding the Dynamics of
Leadership, 78 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 167, 167
(1999) (noting that "[1]eadership is widely recognized to be a social process that de-
pends on both leaders and followers"). For a discussion of leadership literature, see
HARTLEY, supra note 48, at 88-96.
78. See Kenneth F. Janda, Towards the Explication of the Concept of Leadership in
Terms of the Concept of Power, in POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: READINGS FOR AN
EMERGING FIELD 49 (Glenn D. Paige ed., 1972) (stating that "virtually no one writes
on leadership apart from group behavior").
79. Gita De Souza & Howard J. Klein, Emergent Leadership in the Group Goal-
Setting Process, 26 SMALL GROUP RES. 475, 475 (1995).
80. BURNS, supra note 77, at 425.
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Leadership may be recognized in both formal and informal
ways.8' The most obvious manner of achieving formal leadership is
through an individual being selected, by election or otherwise, to
fill a leadership post.8 2 Such a leader gains legitimacy by virtue of
occupying the designated position. Informal leadership, often
called emergent leadership, is more difficult to identify. The emer-
gent leader has been defined as a group member who exerts signifi-
cant influence over other members although no formal authority
has been vested in that member.83 In either case, according to
Thomas Gordon, a leader "still must be perceived as facilitating to
the group if he is to remain the group's leader in a psychological
sense." 84 Gordon points out that once a person is perceived as a
leader by the group in a particular situation, "the members may in
future situations tend to respond more readily to his behavior than
to others'."85 If true, this suggests an inertial tendency to perpetu-
ate incumbent leadership.
2. The Impact of Followership
We have alluded to the interrelationship between leaders and
followers in a group.86 Until relatively recently, examinations of
group activity had been, to a great extent, an examination and
analysis of leadership behavior.87 Several scholars question that
analysis because "it assumes that leadership can be deduced by
looking at the leader's behavior alone; it assumes that one need not
81. See WILSON, supra note 40, at 142-45; see also CARTWRIGHT & ZANDER, supra
note 37, at 364-67.
82. De Souza & Klein, supra note 79, at 476.
83. Id. (citing Craig Eric Schneier & Janet R. Goktepe, Issues in Emergent Leader-
ship: The Contingency Model of Leadership, Leader Sex, Leader Behavior, in 1 SMALL
GROUPS AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 414 (Herbert H. Blumberg et al. eds., 1983)).
84. GORDON, supra note 73, at 53. Gordon quotes Knickerbocker to the same
effect:
The leader may "emerge" as a means to the achievement of objectives de-
sired by a group. He may be selected, elected, or spontaneously accepted by
the group because he [or she] possesses or controls means . . .which the
group desires to utilize to attain their objectives-to obtain increased need
satisfaction.... However, there will be no relationship with the group-no
followers-except in terms of the leader's control of means for the satisfac-
tion of the needs of the followers. Either the leader's objectives must also be
those of the group ... or else accepting the leader's direction must be seen




86. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
87. Cooper et al., supra note 53, at 393.
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bother examining too closely what the followers are actually doing,
what is motivating them, what is driving their behavior."'88
Instead, these scholars examine the interaction between the
leader and the members and explore the "dynamics of follower-
ship ... what drives followers to follow." 89 Leadership must be
distinguished from mere dominance or naked power perpetrated
upon weaker members by the preeminent leader.90 As Burns has
put it,
To perceive the working of leadership in social causation as
motivational and volitional rather than simply as 'economic' or
'ideological' or 'institutional' is to perceive not a lineal sequence
of stimulus-response 'sets' or 'stages,' nor even a network of se-
quential and cross-cutting forces, but a rich and pulsating stream
of leadership-followership forces flowing through the whole so-
cial process.9'
Followership, according to its proponents, involves choices by
members to accept and to follow a leader.92 The follower senses
that "the leader and the leader's 'vision'. . . [are] worthy of active
and concrete support, '93 and that the follower "willingly trusts the
leader... accords the leader the right to make decisions on behalf
of the group to achieve [its] goals." 94 Once a leader has attained
this level of trust, the members will accept the leader's decisions
even when they conflict with the personal interests of one or more
of the members or when they cause some members to alter their
preferences. 95 This acceptance by members is what gives the
leader legitimacy as a spokesperson for the group and, perhaps
even more significantly, as a shaper of the group's goals, aspira-
tions, and strategies.
There are important distinctions between these leadership/fol-
lowership roles and those in which a leader rules by force, intimi-
dation or manipulation, situations that we will call the "dominance
model." While the overt behavior of members may appear to be
the same in both models, there are subtle, but important, differ-
ences between the dominance and followership models. In the
dominance model, the dominated party will look for an opportu-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 395.
90. Id. at 396.
91. BURNS, supra note 77, at 437.






nity to defect while the dominating party will incur the costs associ-
ated with domination and monitoring compliance.96 In the
followership model, on the other hand, there are the efficiencies
wrought by stability and predictability. 97
The stability that is gained through general acceptance of a
leader is, itself, somewhat misleading. The dynamic and fluid na-
ture of the relationship between leader and followers is hidden.
Because our emphasis is on collective purpose and change we
stress the factors that unite leaders and followers as well as
those that differentiate them. This distinction may be elusive to
an observer who sees leaders leading followers but does not un-
derstand that leaders may modify their leadership in recognition
of followers' preferences, or in order to anticipate followers' re-
sponses, or in order to harmonize the actions of both leader and
follower with their common motives, values, and goals.98
Thus, the leader must alternate her exercise of opportunistic, or
common-good, leadership according to the reaction and/or inaction
of her followers. The followers continually communicate needs to
the leader and the leader's viability depends on the followers'
sense that those needs, which may be constantly changing, are be-
ing satisfied.
This dynamic relationship between members (or potential mem-
bers) and the group has also been described in terms of commit-
ment.99 Richard Moreland, et. al., have explored what makes
people join groups. The result of their investigation is a model
based on three psychological processes: evaluation, commitment
and role transitions. 100 Moreland argues that both the individual
and the group are constantly evaluating the relationship and the
benefits they obtain from it.' On the basis of that evaluation,
feelings of commitment may arise but they change over time ac-
cording to previously established reference points, or what the au-
thors call "decision criteria.""' 2 When one of the decision criteria
96. Id. at 399.
97. Id.
98. BURNS, supra note 77, at 426.
99. See Richard Moreland et al., Group Socialization: The Role of Commitment, in
GROUP MOTIVATION 105 (Michael A. Hogg & Dominic Abrams eds., 1993).
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is reached, a "role transition" may take place and a change in the
relationship between the individual and the group occurs.
10 3
Moreland's model begins with a period of investigation. A po-
tential member investigates an existing group 10 4 to determine
whether it meets her needs while the group recruits and evaluates
prospective new members who can assist it in meeting its goals. 
1 5
If the commitment to each other rises to a certain level (i.e. the
decision criteria are met) a role transition (entry) takes place and
the prospective member joins the group.10 6 A socialization period
follows in which the new member tries to change the group to ac-
commodate her personal needs while the group tries to change the
member so that she can, and will, contribute more to the group.
1 0 7
If these goals are achieved, the next role transition (acceptance)
takes place and the individual becomes fully engaged in the
group. 0 8 There is then a maintenance period where the member
and the group negotiate the nature of their ongoing relationship to
maximize the possibility of reaching individual and group goals.10 9
If the negotiation succeeds, the commitment level remains high. 10
If the negotiation fails to satisfy both sides, there is a distancing
(divergence) between the individual and the group and the individ-
ual becomes a marginal member. 1 The negotiation may continue
and, if successful, the member may return to full participation.'
2 If
it fails, the final transition occurs and the member exits the
group.113
3. The Social Loafer Takes a Free Ride
Each of these views of group relations depends upon the exis-
tence of an involved and active membership.1 4 There are other
theories that indicate the likelihood of encountering this type of
103. Id. There are, according to Moreland et al., four role transitions that can occur:
entry, acceptance, divergence and exit. Id.
104. While Moreland implicitly confines himself to existing groups, his analysis
seems to be adaptable to the process of individuals coming together with the idea of
establishing a group.




109. Id. at 106-08.




114. See, e.g., James H. Davis, Social Interaction as a Combinatorial Process in
Group Deceisions, in GRouPs DECISION MAKING 27-30 (Herman Brandstaetter et.
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membership is not great.' 15 One of these theories, the "free-rid-
ing" or "social loafing" theory, suggests that rationally thinking
members (or potential members) of groups might choose not to
exert great effort towards achieving a group's goal. A free rider is
a member of a group who obtains benefits from membership but
who does not bear a proportional share of the costs of procuring
those benefits.' 16 An individual's decision whether to free ride
comes from comparing the net expected benefits from contributing
to the group's efforts and the net expected benefits of free rid-
ing. 117 When the cost of additional (or any) effort exceeds the mar-
ginal increase in benefit derived from that effort, the rational actor
will not exert the effort.' 8
Consider the following situation. A town is facing a water crisis
because its water supply is gradually drying up. If residents are
asked to conserve water at home by taking shorter showers or by
using less water in a bath, the entire town will gain a benefit by
compliance. A resident might conclude, however, that the overall
benefit to her will be slight compared to the significant cost in
terms of her convenience and enjoyment. When one adds the fact
that it is unlikely that any defection by a particular resident would
be discovered, economic rationality indicates that the resident
should defect and use as much water as she desires and let others
conserve. This allows the defector to have the best of both worlds,
current enjoyment and long term water availability. The fallacy, of
course, is that all rationally thinking residents will reach the same
conclusion and, therefore, everyone will defect and the water sup-
ply will be quickly exhausted. 119
Al, eds., 1982) (noting that active participation is a necessary element for most
groups).
115. Id.
116. See Robert Albanese & David D. Van Fleet, Rational Behavior in Groups: The
Free-Riding Tendency, 10 ACAD. MGmT. REV. 244, 244 (1985). Social loafing is a
similar concept. Social loafing involves "a reduction in individual effort when work-
ing on a collective task (in which one's outputs are pooled with those of other group
members) compared to when working alone or co-actively." Kipling Williams et al.,
Working on Collective Tasks: Social Loafing and Social Compensation, in GROUP MO-
TIVATION 140-41 (Michael A. Hogg & Dominic Abrams eds., 1993).
117. Albanese & Van Fleet, supra note 116, at 245.
118. See id.
119. For a well-known example of free riding, see Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-45 (1968). Hardin describes the free-rider problem
in the context of livestock herders using a communal field. As a rational actor, each
herder will seek to maximize his herd because he reaps a direct benefit while the
community shares the negative result of overgrazing. In other words, the herder gets
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4. The Rationale of Active Group Participation
This leaves us with the question of why people do participate in
groups. Professor Pamela Oliver has identified four factors that
help determine varying levels of involvement in community
groups. 120 They are: 1) one's interest in the collective good; 2) the
costs of participation; 3) the extent of social ties among group
members; and 4) a member's expectation about the active partici-
pation of others. 121 Oliver analyzed data to determine why people
became active in local groups.2 2 The question is particularly sali-
ent when applied to issues of leadership. Why does someone be-
come a leader of a local community group that seeks a public
benefit for its membership? 123 Oliver's examination of the data led
to one particularly surprising result. While popular wisdom holds
that people are more willing to participate in collective action if
they believe others will, Oliver found that people become active
because they believe that if they do not, no one else will.1 24 In
other words, the most active members are often very pessimistic
about the likelihood of active participation from their neighbors. 25
There are, of course, less benign reasons why one would seek a
leadership role. For example, one might wish to acquire or consoli-
date power for political or ego-based reasons; one might be seeking
the emoluments, licit or illicit, of control; or one might see leader-
ship as a stepping stone in an ascending career path. Several com-
mentators have noted that leaders (as well as followers) might have
ulterior motives or conflicting loyalties when they assert their influ-
ence on a group. 1 2 6 These hidden agendas often put the leader's
more benefit for less cost. The overexploitation of the common resource is the "trag-
edy of the commons." Id.
120. Pamela Oliver, "If You Don't Do it, Nobody Else Will": Active and Token
Contributors to Local Collective Action, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 601, 602 (1984).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 604. The subjects of the experiments were 1,456 Detroit residents
who where either non-members, token members, or active members of their neigh-
borhood associations. Id. at 601.
123. A public benefit has been defined as one that has a non-excludability feature;
that is, the provision of the good to some members of a group means that it must be
provided for all. Id. at 602; see also Albanese & Van Fleet, supra note 116, at 246
(explaining the relationship between costs of organizing a group and free-riding
impulse).
124. Oliver, supra note 120, at 602.
125. See id. She states that "[p]eople who believe others will provide the collective
good are motivated to ride free; people who do not believe others will provide the
collective good are motivated to provide the good themselves or do without." Id.
126. Leland Bradford, for example, has stated that there is usually a hidden agenda
in addition to the public agenda of a particular group. Bradford points out that a
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goals in direct conflict with those of the group. In other cases, the
hidden agenda does not conflict with the group's goals or does so
only to a partial extent, thus allowing group goals to be achieved,
albeit at a reduced level.
D. Community Stories Redux
Earlier, we described two community groups, each with prob-
lematic leadership. Let us re-consider those narratives in the con-
text of the preceding discussion of group theory, leadership and
followership. Each narrative involved voluntary, primary, work
groups, one to protect residents of a rental building whose owner
wished to have it vacated and the other involving the operation of
an affordable housing cooperative. In each case, the leader initi-
ated non-participatory, non-democratic processes that were con-
trary to that group's charter and purpose. In the cooperative's
case, Ms. Johnson altered the original intent of the membership. In
Arabella's case, the original purpose of the membership was to act
collaboratively against the owner to improve the living conditions
in the building; that original purpose later changed as did the
leader of the group. In each situation, the lawyer representing the
respective group had to have been aware of the leader's usurpa-
tion. Nevertheless, despite the similarities in their origins and his-
tories, the two groups have significant differences. Do these
differences justify a lawyer taking different approaches in the rep-
resentation of these groups in which the respective leaders have
usurped power and eliminated the participatory processes?
In the first narrative, the residents of the rental property sought,
in exchange for moving out, a one-time financial benefit along with
assurances that they would have a habitable abode until they va-
cated the building. As the residents were going to disperse after
achieving their principal goal, there was little likelihood of ongoing
interaction between them. The incumbent leader of this group had
gained her position through a combination of factors including he-
redity, (her late father had organized and lead the group until his
death), capacity (she was well educated, spoke fluent English and
had the time and resources available to seriously pursue the
group's goals), her desire to lead, and the acquiescence of the other
residents. Her style of leadership was superficially democratic-
hidden agenda may be held by group members, the group's leader or by the group
itself. Leland Bradford, The Case of Hidden Agenda, in GROUP DEVELOPMENT 60
(1961). Of course, the effects of a hidden agenda are more likely to be felt when
acted upon by the leader of a group than by an individual member.
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she held meetings of the membership-but it was in fact autocratic
and manipulative. At the meetings, she normally told members
what decisions she had reached or what actions she had taken or
was about to take. Arabella used meetings to manipulate the
other members into agreeing with and/or ratifying her aspira-
tions.127 An example of her usurping the group's collaborative pro-
cess is that only a part of the membership knew that she was
intending to take a bonus from the proceeds of a settlement and, of
those who knew, even fewer understood the magnitude of the bo-
nus she had allocated to herself or the costs it would impose on
them.128
The goals of the cooperative were different in the second narra-
tive. Its members sought long term benefits in the form of decent
and affordable housing that they could control on an ongoing basis.
There was every expectation of continuous interaction among the
members. In fact, that interaction was integrally wrapped into the
substantive goals of the group. There were established procedures
for the selection of leaders and for the operation of the coopera-
tive. This organization exhibited, at least initially, a high degree of
groupness.
Ms. Johnson, the president, had been validly elected to her lead-
ership position by the membership. It was only after ascending to
power that Ms. Johnson discarded the cooperative's procedures
and ruled autocratically. In several cases, she changed cooperative
procedures to the extent that they were directly opposite to the
founding principles of the organization. In some cases, she made
changes that were contrary to law. As a result, the members of the
cooperative became increasingly apathetic; the group dynamic be-
came one of dominance rather than followership. Given the barri-
ers to effective participation, members chose to expend their
energy elsewhere. In all of these situations, the cooperative's at-
torney was aware of Ms. Johnson's actions but he failed to address
127. While the residents exhibit several of the attributes of a group, the "degree of
groupness" is relatively small. The group has an interdependence of fate but only a
minimal interdependence of task. There was little commitment to the group or its
procedures by the membership. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
128. When it was explained to the membership as a whole, several members who
said they knew of the bonus were nonetheless shocked at its size and revoked any
approval they had given. Similarly, of those who did not know of the bonus, they did
not approve when it was pointed out to them. Several members, however, did know
of the bonus and of its size and continued to approve. It appears that Arabella fully
disclosed her intentions concerning the bonus only to those residents she thought
would approve of it. She then used the approval of this small percentage of residents
as validation of her right to the bonus.
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the issues to either Ms. Johnson, the board of directors or the coop-
erative membership. He did not intervene in any way.
The cooperative's lawyer failed to live up to his professional ob-
ligations,129 but even if he had, there would have continued to be
problems associated with his representation of this group. Simi-
larly, there were several problems associated with the representa-
tion of Arabella's resident association. While the lawyer for this
group became aware of Arabella's intentions only late in the repre-
sentation, consider what her response ought to have been. Con-
sider further what that response ought to have been if she had
learned of her agenda earlier in the process.
The Model Rules provide little or no practical guidance in at-
tempting to answer these questions. In fact, many of the ethical
problems that lawyers face in the representation of community
groups are not effectively addressed by the Model Rules. The
Rules are premised on a discrete legal problem, generally between
individuals or clearly defined groups. They do not provide gui-
dance in the more amorphous community setting of the sort de-
picted in our narratives.130 Nor do they provide guidance
concerning the myriad of political problems that arise in group rep-
resentation. In the next section, we will examine the rules as they
apply to group representation and look at some of the commentary
about the lawyer's obligations in such representation.
HI. LAWYERS, ETHICS, AND DEMOCRACY
The standard source of guidance for lawyers who represent com-
munity groups13' is Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional
129. See infra note 131 and accompanying text to help clarify what the lawyer's
professional obligations regarding this issue.
130. Or, for that matter, to the representation of non-community groups such as
labor unions, non-profit corporations and many closely held business corporations.
Similar problems may be encountered concerning the representation of class plaintiffs
in class action litigation. See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Underinclusive Class Actions, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 402 (1996) [hereinafter Morawetz, Class Actions] (discussing difficul-
ties in defining the scope of a class in the class action context). See generally Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School De-
segregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (discussing difficulties in reconciling
the needs of specific clients with the overarching goal of integration ideals).
131. We recognize that lawyers who represent business associations will also con-
front several practical and ethical problems. To a great extent, however, we believe
that, because of the nature of the entities involved, corporate representation and the
representation of community groups present distinct problems and call for different
responses. Therefore, we will discuss the representation of business associations only
to the extent that it illuminates the analysis of ethics in the practice context with
which we are immediately concerned.
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Conduct. 132 Nevertheless, Rule 1.13 and the other relevant Rules
do not effectively address many of the issues that community law-
yers are likely to face. They presume, for example, a clearly deline-
ated decision-making structure that is often absent in the
132. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13 (1998). Rule 1.13 addresses
the situation of the organizational client. It states:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organi-
zation acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act
or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation
of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably
might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substan-
tial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reason-
ably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization
to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organiza-
tion, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority
that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b)
the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization in-
sists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an
action, or refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the
lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent sub-
stantial injury to the organization.
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a
lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation
of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other con-
stituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an
alleged violation of law.
(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he of she has been discharged
because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or
who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to
take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest au-
thority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.
(f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders, or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the
client when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to
those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its di-
rectors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents,
subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the
dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an
appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be
represented, or by the shareholders.
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amorphous community setting. Moreover, they generally envision
the lawyer primarily as a technician, disengaged from substantive
and moral concerns of the group. 133 This creates a blueprint for
lawyering that translates poorly for one engaged in a community
practice.
Commentators have recently begun to examine the ethical di-
lemmas that confront lawyers representing community groups and
have begun to identify some of the shortcomings of the Model
Rules in addressing those dilemmas.1 34 None, however, have con-
sidered in any detail the issues with which we are presently con-
cerned-the nature of a community lawyer's obligation to a group
client in the face of autocratic leadership and the tension between
process and outcomes.
At the broadest level, an attorney's response to a problem she
encounters in the course of representing community groups, with
autocratic leadership or otherwise, must be informed by the goal or
goals of the representation. This simple, yet essential, proposition
begs some difficult questions. While the Model Rules provide for
the client to define the goals of the representation,135 in some
cases, that is too facile a requirement. With community groups, it
is often unclear who the client really is and who the spokesperson
is. Should a lawyer pursue the goals articulated by the group's
leader? If so, how can she verify that the leader is a legitimate
spokesperson for the group? How can the lawyer be certain the
leader's pronouncements are accurate? Is there a recognized pro-
cess within the group for decision making? Should the lawyer ac-
tively participate in the process, either by expressing her own views
or by facilitating consensus? Moreover, even assuming goals are
established by the prescribed process, is the attorney entitled to
question whether those goals are truly in the best interest of the
group or the larger community? We will examine each of these
questions in greater detail in the following sections.
133. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
134. E.g., Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1104; Stephen L. Pepper,
Autonomy, Community, and Lawyers' Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 939, 962-63 (1990);
Ann Southworth, Collective Representation For The Disadvantaged: Variations In
Problems of Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2465 (1999).
135. See ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.2 & CMT 1 (1998). Rule
1.2(a) states that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objec-
tives of representation." Comment 1 explains that the "client has ultimate authority
to determine the purpose to be served by the legal representation."
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A. The Client Speaks
An ethical dilemma that will inevitably confront a lawyer repre-
senting community groups is the question of client identity. At one
level, this might mean identifying which groups within the commu-
nity are clients. Although this is an important and potentially diffi-
cult task, 36 we are presently concerned with questions of client
identity that arise after the designation of group as a client.
Groups speak and act through individuals, and a lawyer may not
always be able to ascertain which individuals truly speak for and
act on behalf of the group. It is common for a lawyer to identify a
group's leader, particularly one who is a strong and visible leader,
as the client. This occasionally leads to the lawyer representing the
interests of the leader rather than the interests of the group, her
nominal client.
The Model Rules address this problem, albeit rather simplisti-
cally. Rule 1.13 states that "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly au-
thorized constituents.' 1 37 This rule is meant to apply to all forms of
organizations, formal and informal.138 It has limited value, how-
ever, as a practical guide to action when an organization lacks
"duly authorized constituents," or, in the words of Ann South-
worth, "lacks reliable internal governance procedures."'1 39 Such a
scenario is all too common in a community practice. Often groups
are not formally organized and operate without bylaws or other
rules of internal governance. Even when a group has undertaken
such formalities, it may view them as externally imposed abstrac-
tions and therefore worthy of little attention in the conduct of its
day-to-day operations.
In general, the response of legal scholars to the disjunct between
the Model Rules and the reality of community representation has
been to encourage lawyers to make clients fit the corporate para-
digm. To the extent the group lacks internal governance proce-
136. See Shauna Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7
CLINICAL L. REV. 147, 187-206 (2000) (examining ethical issues related to a lawyer
who, in advocating for an issue deemed important to the community, could be seen as
representing numerous groups); cf. Nancy Morawetz, Class Actions, supra note 130, at
428-29 (analyzing the difficulties in defining the scope of a class).
137. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (1998).
138. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYER-
ING §1.13:102 (2nd ed. & Supp. 1999) (discussing how Rule 1.13 affects an attorney's
representation of groups); Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1116.
139. Southworth, supra note 134, at 2465. Other authors have noted this problem.
See, e.g., Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1115-20; Leubsdorf, supra
note 29, at 828.
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dures, the lawyer should insist on the development of such
procedures. 140 We question whether this is always the appropriate
course of action. Even if it is appropriate, there are questions of
which governance structure would be best for a particular group
and who should decide.
Michael Fox suggests that the lawyer insist, as a prerequisite to
representation, that the group create a decision-making structure
and appoint a contact person.14 ' This approach is motivated prima-
rily by practical concerns of the lawyer: having clear direction
142
and, if the chosen course of action fails, being protected from accu-
sations of having acted without proper authority. Fox argues that
this approach has the added benefit of creating a process through
which the group can better define its goals. 143 For Fox, however,
that benefit is clearly secondary to the benefit of self-protection,
and apparently he would advocate a formal decision-making struc-
ture even if the group had defined its goals through "an informal
consensus process.' 1 44 While the presence of more formal proce-
dures may provide an organizational lawyer greater practical and
ethical comfort, if a group is able to make and articulate decisions
through informal processes, the self-interest of the lawyer is an in-
sufficient reason to demand a change. Ethical guidelines should be
constructed in light of the reality of practice; reality should not be
forced into the presumptive framework of existing ethical
guidelines.
If a group is truly so disorganized that it cannot make and con-
vey decisions, it is unlikely to identify, let alone achieve, its goals.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth considering whether a highly
disorganized group is a group at all, or whether it is simply an ag-
gregation of individuals. If it is the latter, Model Rule 1.7, the gen-
eral rule on conflicts of interest, rather than Rule 1.13 would apply,
and the question with which we are presently concerned would no
longer be present. To make such a determination, a lawyer should
consider the characteristics of groups discussed earlier in Part II.
Assuming that there is sufficient connection among the individuals
to consider them members of a group, the group will need to de-
velop at least a rudimentary decision-making process for it to have
140. See Michael J. Fox, Some Rules for Community Lawyers, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE
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a chance of succeeding. For the lawyer to simply demand that the
group establish such a process, however, ignores the fact that mem-
bers of nascent community groups may have limited experience
making decisions under the circumstances they are likely to en-
counter in their new endeavor. Moreover, regardless of whether
they lack such experience, the group could benefit from the law-
yer's ability to present additional options and frame the relevant
considerations. While the lawyer has no monopoly on knowledge,
her insight and experience may provide an important contribution
to the development of an effective decision-making process.
Recognizing this, Stephen Ellmann recommends that the lawyer
actively participate in helping the group to develop a governance
structure. 145 For example, he argues that the lawyer should work
with the group leadership by "helping them to identify the relevant
choices [of decision-making method] and offering her advice about
what alternatives might be best.114 6 He prefers working with a
group's leaders to working directly with the membership because,
he argues, it promotes the individual autonomy of group members
as well as their connection to the group and the autonomy of the
group as a whole. 147 However, Ellmann's deference to the group's
leadership in choosing a decision-making process is not absolute.
If the methods chosen fall "beneath a baseline threshold of demo-
cratic fairness," the lawyer is justified in challenging the leaders'
process. 148 Ellmann defends such intervention first by assuming
that the group embraces democratic values-defined as "fidelity to
the principle that each person has an equal say in decisionmak-
ing"-and second by favoring individual autonomy over group
autonomy.149
While we concur that a lawyer should help the group to create a
decision-making structure, if that will serve the goals of the repre-
sentation, we question whether it is always best to work through
the leadership. One might, instead, work directly with the mem-
bership of a group. The method of making decisions, including the
145. See Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1151 (advocating that a law-
yer encourage group members to choose a leader).
146. Id. If no leaders exists, Ellmann states that the lawyer may need to encourage
the group to select leaders, while recognizing that such a selection requires some form
of process.
147. Id. (stating that the leaders are potentially more attuned to the "members'
wishes and sensibilities" and in "empowering the leadership, the lawyer buttresses the
autonomy of the group as a whole.").
148. Id. at 1152.
149. Id. at 1152-53.
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decision of whom to appoint as leader, is a defining characteristic
of a group. 5 ° Members may be more likely to feel committed to
the group if they have had an opportunity to shape that character-
istic. A strong sense of commitment, in turn, may enhance the vi-
tality and effectiveness of the group.' 51
At this early stage in a group's development, it may be difficult
for a lawyer to identify or ascertain the legitimacy of its leader-
ship.' 5 2 It is likely that the group will have what the sociological
literature terms an "emergent leadership."'1 3 Interacting with the
membership may allow a lawyer to verify the legitimacy of the
group's leaders and assess the efficacy of existing decision-making
structures. Assessing the legitimacy of an emergent leader, how-
ever, is not an easy task. A lawyer must have enough contact with
the members to be able to judge their degree of trust in the leader-
ship and commitment to the group. 154 Moreover, this is not an as-
sessment that can be made once and relied on for the remaining
course of representation. Given the dynamic nature of the leader-
ship-followership relationship, the lawyer must be constantly at-
tuned to the question of legitimacy of the leadership. 55
In addition to our concerns with Ellmann's method for establish-
ing a decision-making process in client groups, we question his con-
tention that a lawyer must promote a particular kind of decision-
making process, namely one that is participatory and democratic.
Ellmann's focus on participatory democracy is grounded in his po-
sition that, for lawyers representing organizations, the guiding ethi-
cal principal is to protect the autonomy of individual group
members. 56 Ellmann and others argue that group participation
may be an exercise of individual autonomy insofar as an individ-
ual's identity, or selfhood, is substantially formed in and by her
interrelations with other individuals and groups of individuals, par-
ticularly those with whom she knowingly and willfully interre-
150. See supra notes 75-77.
151. Of course, in some groups the membership is quite disinterested in participat-
ing. This is the problem of free-riding discussed supra Part II.C.3.
152. See Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1151 (stating that a lawyer
may need to encourage the group choosing a leader in order to place the decision-
making responsibilities in the hands of the group).
153. Recall the discussion of emergent leadership supra notes 82-83 and accompa-
nying text.
154. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
156. Or more precisely, to protect the twin goals of "individual autonomy and mu-
tual connection." Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1133.
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lates. 157 At times, individual autonomy and group connection are
in tension,158 but to the extent group participation is expressive of
individual autonomy the goals are more likely to coincide.1 5 9
When that occurs, group participation can provide disenfranchised
individuals an experience that builds, rather than diminishes, self-
esteem. 60 This results in "consciousness-raising.' 161 Thus group
participation promotes autonomy by recognizing and respecting
the individual's choice to interact with a group, yet dampens auton-
omy by subordinating the individual will to that of the collective. 62
By insisting on a "baseline of democratic and participative pro-
cess,"'163 the lawyer can meet her fundamental responsibility to
"secur[e] some protection for individual autonomy within the
groups of which the individual is a part.' 164
In a similar vein, William Simon argues that an important, if not
primary, goal of community representation is to constitute non-hi-
erarchical communities of interest.1 65 In this vision of community
practice, the lawyer strives to enhance the client's ability to express
the client's interests in the context of community and, ideally, hold
the lawyer and other members of a community of interest account-
able.166 Put somewhat differently, Lucie White argues that a com-
munity lawyer's goal is to create non-hierarchical settings that
enable individual participation. 67 The ideal of community practice
endorsed by Simon and White, although differing from Ellmann in
157. Id. at 1122-23; Pepper, supra note 134, at 940-42.
158. See Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1122.
159. We are using the term "expressive" in a somewhat different sense than R.F.
Bales who uses the term to describe the ways in which group members interact. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text. We use it to describe the degree to which the
characteristics of a group correlate to the identity of an individual member, or, put
another way, the degree to which group participation provides a member with an
avenue for realizing her identity. Thus it describes the relation of group identity and
individual identity rather than the behavior of individuals within the context of the
group.
160. See Fox, supra note 140, at 6.
161. Lucie White, "Democracy" In Development Practice: Essays on a Fugitive
Theme, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1073, 1084 (1997) [hereinafter White, "Democracy" In De-
velopment Practice] (describing that groups of impoverished women felt empowered
not merely through income-producing products but combining that with conscious-
ness-raising).
162. See Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1122; Pepper, supra note
134, at 940 (describing the interrelated relationship between self and community).
163. Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1145.
164. Id. at 1146.
165. Simon, supra note 8, at 485.
166. See id. at 486-89 (discussing attorney-client relationship through the lens of
Critical Legal Studies).
167. White, "Democracy" In Development Practice, supra note 161, at 1081.
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the relative importance of connection over autonomy, is similar in
the importance they place on participation and collaboration
among group members and their lawyers.
We agree with much of what Ellmann, Simon, and White advo-
cate. Lawyers should be sensitive to the autonomy of individual
members within a group. Enabling individuals to participate
meaningfully and to express their interests within the groups with
which they self-identify can have tremendous empowering effects.
We disagree, however, with the preeminence these authors place
on expressive values. Our first disagreement is that in the typical
situation, obtaining desired substantive outcomes is more impor-
tant to the client than protecting individual autonomy or promot-
ing non-hierarchical participation. Second, assuming that
protection of individual autonomy and creating and maintaining
communities of interest is important, a highly participatory process
is not necessarily the best way of achieving those goals.
Groups generally do not seek legal representation for the pur-
pose of promoting the autonomy of their individual members or to
constitute a community of common interests. 16 Rather, they usu-
ally seek representation in order to understand and/or address a
perceived problem. 69 They hope to improve living conditions or
prevent displacement, promote small businesses, combat inade-
quate health services, provide better education or child care, or
perhaps obtain payment as compensation for some injury. To pro-
mote non-hierarchical participation, or the protection of individual
autonomy above the attainment of substantive goals, as the funda-
mental principal of responsible lawyering will inevitably lead to in-
stances in which the lawyer's actions undermine the very basis for
representation.
For example, in the case of Arabella, if the lawyer had insisted
that the group adopt a more participatory process, it is possible
that Arabella would have opted out of her leadership role. Given
the constraints that 1) most members of the group were only
168. There may be instances where the primary goal of representation, as defined
by the clients themselves, is to enhance connection or to constitute a community of
interest. For example, Lucie White describes a program in which women participated
in a weekly mutual support group that eventually made a quilt depicting the life sto-
ries of the participants. See id. at 1081-83. Although the program produced few tan-
gible outcomes other than the quilt itself, the women involved found it to be
empowering.
169. See Stefano Agostini, Advertising and Solicitation: A Comparative Analysis of
Why Italian and American Lawyers Approach Their Profession Differently, 10 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 329, 359 (1996) (stating that individuals seek "legal advice to
resolve a controversy after it has occurred").
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weakly committed to it, or were free riders, and 2) no other mem-
ber possessed Arabella's skills, it is likely that no one would have
stepped in to replace her which would cause the group to dis-
integrate. Even if someone did step in, there may be little incen-
tive or need to create a participatory decision-making structure in
order to resolve a one-shot problem that is both time and space
specific.
The cooperative case, on the other hand, warrants a more par-
ticipatory process. This is true not to protect autonomy, though
that might be an added benefit, but to obtain the substantive goal
of effective cooperative ownership. Cooperatives, because they
are long term, multi-faceted undertakings, depend upon a par-
ticipatory process. Each member should share in and take respon-
sibility for the management of the property and the conduct of the
cooperative's affairs. The need for a participatory process will be
similarly important to any collective endeavor in which a signifi-
cant interdependence of task is essential to achieving and maintain-
ing the group's goals. To the extent group participation also
synthesizes autonomy and connection, the group's expressive and
instrumental goals will reinforce one another; each member's en-
hanced sense of connection to the group will translate into greater
deditzation to the task at hand, and the resulting fruits of that effort
will translate into a greater sense of connection. 170
Even if autonomy and connection are important goals in them-
selves, it is unclear that a lawyer must ensure a participatory and
democratic process in order to protect or promote them. What if a
group deliberates and decides that it will delegate virtually all au-
thority to one or a few leaders, with only the most fundamental
questions being referred to the membership? 171 Such a decision
could be viewed, not so much as an abdication of autonomy, but
rather as a common form of human interaction and organization.
Similarly suppose that the group is composed of members of an
ethnic or national group who adopt the decision-making structure
170. The synthesis of autonomy and connection can also enhance the instrumental
value of groups. Participation in an expressive group can generate the "collective
ability to analyze and act upon complex social problems [that] can be more powerful
than the aggregate of each individual's capacities for analysis and action." White,
"Democracy" In Development Practice, supra note 161, at 1087.
171. Most corporations and many nations are organized is this way. Perhaps this is
because, as Ellmann himself recognizes, autocratic leaders may "inspire and mobilize
their members." Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1124. "Sometimes
people voluntarily join, and feel deeply loyal to, groups in which they know that their
views will not be taken into account on many or most questions." Id. at 1133.
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commonly used by similar organizations in their culture, and that
structure does not resemble participatory democracy. 172 Such a
structure might better express the group member's identities. De-
cision-making structures other than ones that are highly par-
ticipatory may be more reflective of the characteristics which
define a group and form its connections. Thus, a lawyer's efforts to
encourage a participatory, democratic process may further the law-
yer's own values but hinder, rather than enhance, the expressive
value of a members' group participation. 173
Furthermore, there may be methods, other than debates and
elections, that permit members (or outsiders) to hold leaders ac-
countable. For example, members may be able to exit the group if
they learn of the leader's actions and disagree with them.' 74 The
effectiveness of exit as a mechanism for accountability will vary de-
pending on the cost of exit.' 75 In the case of Arabella, a tenant
who sought to pursue litigation independently of the group may
have been able to obtain as good a monetary settlement, although
she would have had to expend more time and energy to achieve
that result. In the case of the cooperative, the cost of exit is ex-
tremely high because it entails moving, perhaps in a difficult hous-
172. See Cruz, supra note 29, at 246-48 (relating how Native-Americans' legal
choices are shaped by the different cultural norms which shape tribal and federal
law).
173. One response to this critique is that the individuals who accept a non-par-
ticipatory regime suffer from false-consciousness, and thus the community lawyer's
practice should not be "designed to serve the clients' preexisting interests, but to re-
constitute them as a community defined by common interests." Simon, supra note 8,
at 486. In this vision, "[c]ommunication among clients and direct participation are
valued for their potential to increase understanding and solidarity and to safeguard
against hierarchy." Id. at 487. While we are sympathetic to these ideals, we question
whether they are always the appropriate ends to pursue. Another response would be
to point out that, at least in the first example, there was a first-order decision, made
through a democratic process, to abdicate further participation. While we agree that
initial participation of that sort is often critical to establishing the legitimacy of the
leadership, as demonstrated by the second example, it is not always necessary. In
addition, that limited role is far from what Ellman and others envision.
174. See James Gray Pope, Two Faces, Two Ethics: Labor Union Lawyers and the
Emerging Doctrine of Entity Ethics, 68 OR. L. REV. 1, 21 (1989) (discussing sharehold-
ers' option of exit); Southworth, supra note 134, at 2454.
175. Similarly, scholars have emphasized the importance of being able to opt-out of
class actions in analyzing the need for greater accountability to class members. See
Samuel Isaacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999
Sup. CT. REV. 337, 367-68 (1999) (noting that the value of the right to opt-out varies
depending on the value of the individual class member's claim); Peter Margulies, The
New Class Action Jurisprudence and Public Interest Law, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 487, 502 (1999) (noting that legal or practical constraints limit a class action
litigant's ability to opt out even though her concerns are not being addressed).
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ing market. In addition to the exiting option, outside entities, such
as government agencies, lenders, or funders, also may be in a posi-
tion to hold the leader accountable. The cooperative's bank, for
example, requested copies of the minutes of the board. As a result,
Ms. Johnson made a half-hearted attempt to reconstitute the board
and began to hold meetings more regularly. Despite that external
pressure, however, the renewed meetings did not translate into
substantive reform in the cooperative's governance and Ms. John-
son continued her autocratic rule. Had the bank been more persis-
tent or forceful, perhaps a true transformation would have
occurred.1 76
Returning to the question with which we began this section, we
can now sketch an outline of the factors a lawyer must consider
when determining whether the leaders with whom she interacts
speak for the group. Usually the fundamental issue will be
whether the purported leadership is legitimate. Model Rule 1.13
assumes the existence of an effective internal governance proce-
dure to establish legitimacy. This approach ignores the realities of
community practice, which is often characterized by client groups
that are not highly organized in that sense. Ellmann and others go
further, arguing that the lawyer should ensure the existence of a
particular kind of governance procedure, one that is participatory
and democratic.1 7 1 While a democratic procedure may offer the
lawyer a high degree of comfort in the leader's legitimacy, it is not
the only, nor necessarily the best, way to achieve that assurance,
and it may risk elevating process over product where such a prior-
ity is neither desired by the client nor an important goal of the
representation. In the absence of such a process, the lawyer must
look both to the nature of the group and to the followership dy-
namic of the membership. Has the leader attained and maintained
a leadership position by establishing credibility and trust, or by ma-
nipulation or coercion? Does this question matter, is it impor-
tant-particularly in a one-shot group that has instrumental (as
opposed to expressive) goals-so long as the instrumental goals are
being met? A benevolent Machiavelli might be the most effective,
efficient and, perhaps, even desirable option from the standpoint of
the members. In any case, the lawyer should determine whether
176. A lawyer's ability to involve outside stakeholder's in an effort to ensure the
legitimacy of an organization's leadership is limited by her ethical obligation not to
disclose confidential information. See Rule 1.6.
177. Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1148-49 (agreeing with Binder
that it is the lawyer's responsibility to design a decision-making process).
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there are mechanisms that permit members to hold the leadership
accountable, at least for the honest pursuit of their goals, even in
the absence of direct participation in decision making.
B. Decisions and Dissonance
Assuming that a group has a legitimate leader, a lawyer may
nonetheless face dilemmas when directed by the leader to pursue a
certain strategy. There might be a significant group faction that
believes the course of action is improper, resulting in discord
within the group. The dissenting faction might seek to recruit the
lawyer as an ally in promoting its competing vision. Or, with or
without the presence of dissent, the lawyer might believe that the
group's decision, as expressed by a legitimate leader, is the wrong
one, either because it is not in the best interest of the group or
because it is not in the best interest of the community. Faced with
any of these dilemmas, a lawyer must decide whether, and in what
manner, to participate in or instigate a debate on the issue.
1. The Rule of Deference
If a lawyer were to turn to Model Rule 1.13 for direction on
whether to intervene in group decision making, she would con-
clude that the proper course of action would be, except in a limited
range of situations, to stand aside and abide by the result of the
group's decision-making process. This is the implication of the
Rule's admonition that an organizational lawyer should follow the
instructions of a duly authorized constituent unless the lawyer be-
lieves the actions of a member were or would be in violation of that
member's obligation to the group or that they constitute a legal
violation that could be imputed to the group and such actions are
likely to result in substantial injury to the group. 178 Absent such
injurious wrongdoing, and assuming the group has not invited the
lawyer's participation, there is nothing in the rule that requires, or
encourages, a lawyer to ensure the full airing of dissenting or alter-
nate views.179
178. See supra note 131 for text of Model Rule 1.13.
179. See Rule 1.13, cmt. 3 (noting that "[w]hen constituents of the organization
make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if
their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, in-
cluding ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province."). But see
Rule 1.13, cmt. 4 (stating that "[e]ven in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated
by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational
client ... matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to
warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization.").
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Proponents of Rule 1.13's hands-off approach argue that it pro-
tects the lawyer from political quagmires and promotes client au-
tonomy (although now at the level of the group, as well as at the
level of the individual members). It contributes to a lawyer's self-
preservation, because "[lawyers who have kept a little distance
from different factions within a group will best survive the inevita-
ble factional dispute. ' 180 By staying out of the fray, the lawyer
casts herself in the role of a technician who is not concerned with
the cohesion of the group or the quality of the decision that is
reached, but simply performs tasks as directed. Proponents also
argue that this approach is most consistent with the value of auton-
omy. Assuming the decision is the result of a fair process chosen
by the members, any incursion by the lawyer would be paternalis-
tic. 8' Intervention is appropriate only when accountability is in
doubt and only to the extent necessary to reinstate
accountability.' 82
Most lawyers in a community practice, however, will find this
aloof approach personally unsatisfying, despite any perceived pro-
tective benefits it may have. For those concerned with autonomy, a
lawyer's efforts to facilitate group cohesion may enhance, rather
than diminish, individual autonomy by strengthening valued group
connections. As Ellman observed, "many people may not be
deeply moved by fair process when they feel the wrong decision
has been made.' '1 83
180. Fox, supra note 140, at 6. For similar reasons, Scott Cummings criticizes the
vision of lawyer as organizer. "The simplest strategy for averting conflicts is for the
lawyer to avoid simultaneously serving as an organizer and a legal representative."
Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing,
48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 513 (2001).
181. DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSEL-
ING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 148-49 (1977) (concluding that the lawyer can-
not usually determine which decision will give the client the greatest satisfaction
because the client may place different value on the various consequences of the deci-
sion). See Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1151 (finding leaders are
better positioned to make decisions that reflect their members' wishes); see also Pope,
supra note 174, at 53-54 (stating that there is less need for a lawyer intervening if the
group has strong leadership and constituents are capable of protecting themselves).
182. See Southworth, supra note 134, at 2469 (noting that "[t]he more reliable the
decisionmaking structures and opportunities for exit by individual members, the less
direct responsibility the lawyer should bear for discerning the interests and prefer-
ences of the group's members and responding to evidence of dissent within the
group."). Ellmann suggests that even if the process is sufficient to ensure that minor-
ity views are heard and to hold the leadership accountable, it might be appropriate for
a lawyer to advise dissenters to seek independent counsel. Ellmann, Client-Centered-
ness, supra note 8, at 1161.
183. Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1154.
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Beyond concerns of autonomy, a lawyer's helping members to
reach a more unified decision could contribute to the strength and
longevity of the group, and thereby help it achieve long-term
goals. 184 Moreover, by promoting and participating in a healthy
debate, the lawyer encourages the group to engage in creative
problem solving, organizational maturation, and also challenges in-
dividual members to reexamine their own views. 85 Finally, the
lawyer may have strong views as to how well the course of action
chosen by the group corresponds to the lawyer's own perceptions
of the group's interests or the larger community. Permitting the
lawyer to express those views could enhance the discussion, while
prohibiting such participation would surely limit the lawyer's own
autonomy. 186
Certainly some client groups, particularly well-established, so-
phisticated groups, often prefer the distance associated with the
lawyer-as-technician approach, and such a preference should be
respected. 187 Yet, while such representation presents fewer in-
stances when it is appropriate for a lawyer to participate in intra-
group debates, it surely will present a few. Even the most sophisti-
cated corporations look to their counsel for advice during times of
184. See id. at 1170-73 (discussing the transformative process that can occur as the
lawyer and the community are influenced and respond to their interaction with each
other); Simon, supra note 8, at 482 (arguing that where group members who hold a
minority viewpoint are encouraged to press their position, "[a] potential byproduct of
such efforts is to contribute to the democratization of the organization or class, to
strengthen it by making its leadership more sensitive to its members or by broadening
patterns of member participation."); cf. Bell, supra note 130, at 512 (suggesting that a
lawyer should play a role of negotiator, innovator, and organizer rather than simply
litigating their client's position to resolve group conflicts).
185. Cf. Peter Margulies, Multiple Communities or Monolithic Clients: Positional
Conflicts of Interest and the Mission of the Legal Services Lawyer, 67 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2339, 2354 (1999) [hereinafter Margulies, Legal Services Lawyer] (arguing that
an ethical prohibition against one lawyer advocating inconsistent legal positions on
behalf of two community groups "hampers the reframing of issues, freezing old di-
chotomies and frustrating the serendipitous discovery of common ground"). Margu-
lies also acknowledges "the positive effects of group conflict, which can make groups
more accountable and democratic, refine shared objectives, and promote surfacing of
new objectives as the context of disputes changes over time." Id. at 2361; see also
Simon, supra note 8, at 482 (finding that intraclass conflict can create a stronger group
with more responsive leaders and wider membership).
186. Diamond, supra note 9, at 114, 122. Consider, however, whether these same
issues arise in an instrumental, one-shot situation, particularly when the members
have chosen to remove themselves from the decision-making process or when they are
free riding on the efforts of the leader.
187. Fox, for example, argues that "relatively experienced community groups want
their lawyers to act as technicians." Fox, supra note 140, at 6; see also Marisco, supra
note 11, at 657 (recounting an organization's preference to have the lawyer fulfill its
legal needs without acting collaboratively with the lawyer).
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turmoil and those that fail to do so ignore an important source of
experience and expertise.
Not only does Rule 1.13 address too narrow a range of situations
in which intervention is required, it also sets forth a method of in-
tervention that has limited relevance to community lawyering.
Rule 1.13 admonishes the lawyer to "proceed as is reasonably nec-
essary in the best interest of the organization," which according to
the Rule ordinarily means referring issues up the organization's
chain of command. 18 Recourse to the organization's highest au-
thority is recommended only if "warranted by the circum-
stances,"18a 9 and a response other than referral up the chain of
command, the comment's suggest, is reserved for a relatively lim-
ited set of circumstances. 190 Community groups, particularly
younger and less hierarchical groups, are less likely to have formal
policies or more than one layer of hierarchy to which an attorney
could appeal for resolution. Instead, it is likely that issues must be
raised and resolved in a directors' meeting or in sometimes chaotic
membership meetings. In any case, these issues, when raised by a
lawyer, are likely to expose dissensions in the group and perhaps
engender hostility among the factions and against the lawyer, out-
comes that often appear contrary to the best interests of the
organization.
2. The Need for Engagement
If Rule 1.13 takes too narrow a view by addressing lawyer inter-
vention only in cases of injurious unlawful behavior and by circum-
scribing the method of intervention, the question then becomes
when, and in what manner, is it appropriate for the lawyer to ac-
tively play a role in the resolution of a group's internal dispute or
question a group's undisputed decision? Integrating the entity the-
ory of representation and principals of agency law, Geoffrey Haz-
ard and William Hodes argue that, "when a deep division of
opinion arises within the entity that threatens its well-being or even
its survival,... the lawyer may have to take action within the or-
188. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1998).
189. Id.
190. See ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b), cmt. 4 (amended
2003). An earlier version of Rule 1.13 recommended a range of measures rather than
narrowly focusing on the chain-of-command approach, while at the same time placed
a greater emphasis on taking steps that would minimize disruptions to the organiza-
tion. See ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1998) (stating that
"[a]ny measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the
organization .. )
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ganization to resolve this matter, because this is in the best interest
of the organization."' 9' As a preliminary matter, it must be ac-
knowledged that this is more an alteration than an internally con-
sistent expansion of Rule 1.13. Rule 1.13 and Hazard and Hodes'
statement suggest very different answers to the question of how a
lawyer ascertains the best interests of the organization. Rule 1.13
directs the lawyer to respond to divisions by listening to the organi-
zation's duly authorized constituents, while Hazard and Hodes di-
rect the lawyer to listen, at least in part, to her own independent
assessment of the situation.
Because we find Rule 1.13 to be inadequate in addressing the
representational realities in this regard, we are less concerned with
whether Hazard and Hodes are true to the Rule than whether their
formulation provides an adequate guide to the community lawyer.
While we agree that a lawyer should be permitted to bring her own
independent judgment to the table, we find their formulation mis-
directed in other ways. Hazard and Hodes want the lawyer to
watch for elements that threaten the well-being and longevity of a
group.' 92 Well-being (in the degree of groupness sense) and lon-
gevity, however, are not always in a group's best interest. For ex-
ample, too deep a set of compromises for the sake of unity might
have the effect of overwhelming the original purposes of the group.
In addition, longevity for its own sake can lead to oligarchic
bureaucratization and stultification.' 93 And although encouraging
unity can have many advantages,' 94 it is primarily a means to an
end rather than an end in itself. Even for those who prize connec-
tion, the unity of a group is not a desirable goal if there are divi-
sions within the group that are so profound that the dissenting
members feel sufficiently alienated so that the group is no longer
expressive of their identity.1 95
191. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 17.5 (3rd ed. & Supp. 2004).
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Robert Michels, Democracy and the Iron Rule of Oligarchy, in POLIT-
ICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF
MODERN DEMOCRACY 345-61 (Eden & Cedar Paul trans., Dover Publ'n 1959) (1915)
(exploring the contradiction in syndicalism and labor movements where the group,
representing the "masses," must be led by representatives who then become their own
oligarchy within the movement).
194. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
195. See Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1158, 1161-62 (discussing
the lawyer's role in relation to the group's harmony or disharmony); cf. Simon, supra
note 8, at 482 (noting that disaffiliation may rob the group of the strength it may
achieve by addressing the dissatisfied members' objections).
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A different focus of representation is required when a lawyer
finds herself representing a group client whose members disagree,
or with whom she disagrees. The lawyer should not simply use her
skills to bring factions together; she should also provide advice that
is informed by an understanding of the group and the goals of rep-
resentation. Model Rule 2.1 provides a guarded endorsement to
this approach: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise in-
dependent professional judgment and render candid advice. In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation. ' 196 While this rule
requires a lawyer to express advice, even if it runs contrary to the
wishes of the client, and permits that advice to be based on a range
of factors, it does not call for the proactive role we envision. In-
deed, when read in light of Rule 1.13, it seems clear that the Model
Rules expect a lawyer to challenge an organizational client, if at all,
only with great caution.
More consistent with our view is the notion of "counsel to the
situation," attributed to Justice Brandeis,197 in which the lawyer
strives to serve the totality of the interests intertwined in a matter
instead of representing each of the individuals involved. 198 Inter-
estingly, Stephen Pepper, an author who, like Ellmann, emphasizes
individual autonomy and group connection, adopts a counsel-to-
the-situation approach in arguing that the attorney should inter-
vene if she perceives that a leader is acting contrary to the best
interests of the group, even if the leader's action results from a fair
decision-making process. He presents the example of a lawyer who
has represented a family business for many years. 199 The business
has been characterized by amicable labor relations, close family in-
volvement in the business, cooperative relationship with the union,
and a perception of employees as highly valuable and part of the
business family.2° Over time, management has devolved to a sin-
gle, younger member of the family.20 1 Based on her perception of
196. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1998).
197. John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683,
702 (1965).
198. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 138, § 2.2:102; see also Thomas L. Shaffer, The
Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. LAW L. REV. 963, 980-81 (1987) (char-
acterizing the lawyer for the situation model as seeking to attain or sustain human
harmonies resting in part on "a common reality prior to the individuals ... and in part
on a hope for this common reality").




the business environment, that individual informs the lawyer of her
plans to reduce compensation and aggressively counter any union
opposition to that plan.20 2 Pepper recommends three things: accu-
rate legal advice;203 a "full conversation "204 or "moral dialogue "205
with the leader reminding her of the group's history and tradi-
tion;20 6 and going directly to other group members to explain what
might happen and advising them as to how they could prevent un-
desired consequences. 20 7
While Pepper's application of the concept of lawyering for the
situation goes a considerable distance towards providing effective
guidance for the lawyer, it falls short. Importantly, he supports in-
tervention by the lawyer based on the lawyer's informed view of
what is in the best interest of the group even in the absence of any
shortcomings in the decision-making process. This position should
be qualified by the understanding that a group's interests are not
static, but rather are constantly evolving through dialogue and in-
teraction.20 8 The significant shortcoming of Pepper's vision, how-
ever, is the restrictiveness that stems from his emphasis on
protecting autonomy and connection rather than outcomes. For
example, he acknowledges that the lawyer should adopt the same
course of action if the facts were altered and the manager sought to
deviate from a historically harsh approach to labor and improve
employee rights and relations.20 9
This unquestioning allegiance to the client group does not square
with our vision. When a lawyer's practice is oriented to identifying
and furthering overarching community goals, the decisions and ac-
tions of the client group must be measured against those goals. If
the divergence is qualitatively and quantitatively significant, the
lawyer confronts a difficult decision. Shauna Marshall argues that
a lawyer's decision whether "to work with one constituency over
another; to try and stay in the middle and serve as an intermediary;
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 964.
205. Id. at 960, 965 n.70.
206. Id. at 965.
207. Pepper's approach arguably lacks internal consistency. While he rejects the
notion that a lawyer could have a better sense of an individual client's community
connections and identity than the client herself, he does not seem troubled by the
notion that a lawyer can have a better conception of a group's identity than a member
of the group, even a "duly authorized" member.
208. Simon, supra note 8, at 482-83.
209. See Pepper, supra note 134, at 965 n.70.
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[or] to abandon a project ' 210 should be "guided by the knowledge
that the community lawyer has about her community, its priorities,
its values, its commitments. ' 21 1 The decision should be guided by
"a defensible set of community goals" as adopted by the lawyer.212
This view differs somewhat from that of Simon, who conceives of
counselor to the situation as a "practice [that] is not designed to
serve the clients' preexisting interests, but to reconstitute them as a
community defined by common interests. ' 213  The goal, in our
view, is not simply to "enhance the client's capacity to express her
own interests. 2 14 The lawyer must also engage the client, as an
equal, in a dialogue on the merits of an issue, informed by both the
lawyer's understanding of the client-group's community and her
understanding of the interests of the broader community she seeks
to serve. Thus, a lawyer is confronted with a number of questions
when determining the appropriateness of engaging in an intra-
group debate or fomenting debate around an uncontested decision.
She should ask whether the outcome of that debate will shape or
reshape the group's goals and/or its ability to achieve those goals
and whether a particular course of action would be inconsistent
with the group's interests or the interests of the broader
community.
3. The Risks of Engagement
Intervening in intra-group disputes or challenging undisputed
decisions presents substantial risks. By expressing a view, even in
the context of a discussion structured to bring out differing posi-
tions and to work towards consensus, the lawyer could further ex-
acerbate divisions within the group. If the lawyer challenges the
leadership, either directly or by siding with a dissenting faction, it
210. Marshall, supra note 136, at 220.
211. Id.; see also Cruz, supra note 29, at 260 (stating that the lawyer understanding
the individual's relationship to the community and "understanding the legal issue
from a historical, cultural, social and political perspective as well as from a legal per-
spective" can be crucial for successful community representation); Diamond, supra
note 9, at 115-16 (remarking that "[i]t is necessary for one who aspires to be a commu-
nity lawyer to understand the issues confronting the community and the goals and
aspirations of its residents."); cf Pepper, supra note 134, at 964-65 (recommending
that the lawyer give accurate advice and engage the individual in a "full conversation"
that includes the community's norms).
212. Diamond, supra note 9, at 115. Our view differs from Margulies, who thinks
the lawyer should be guided by the overarching goal of "social access" and under that
rubric should be able to represent "the multiplicity of interests in the community be-
ing served." Margulies, Legal Services Lawyer, supra note 185, at 2339, 2362.




could cast doubt on the legitimacy of the leadership.215 The lawyer
also risks undermining her own credibility if she is seen as an in-
truder or manipulator. In light of these concerns, we largely agree
with Ellmann that the lawyer, in giving advice, must guard against
destabilizing and dominating the group. Thus, "[i]f the lawyer who
gives advice based on her own values risks alienating or dividing
the group, perhaps she can partially overcome these dangers by
showing the group members that she in fact shares their core con-
victions. '' 216 Moreover, the lawyer has "an obligation of constant
vigilance against her own overreaching. ' 217 While it is certainly
true, as White has noted, that "[s]uccessful collective actions re-
quire very skillful facilitation, 218 a lawyer should exercise caution
before assuming such a role. If possible, it is better for a lawyer to
strengthen the existing leadership's ability to facilitate and to par-
ticipate in the dialogue while the lawyer acts merely as an advisor.
In addition, it is critical that the lawyer make her conception of
community goals known to the client from the outset. Marshall
suggests that the lawyer and client group engage in a "moral dia-
logue," in which the parties examine their goals and values, iden-
tify the goals of the representation, develop possible strategies for
achieving those goals, anticipate potential problems, and establish
problem-solving structures. 219 She further suggests that the results
of this dialogue be memorialized in a retainer agreement.220 Simi-
larly, the result of such a dialogue will inform the lawyer's decision
of whether to work with a particular client group and will help the
lawyer assess whether the group's goals conform to the defensible
set of community goals with which the lawyer entered the dialogue.
215. See Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1152 (stating that a "lawyer
who does try to block the leadership's running of the group might undercut the auton-
omy of the group-the ability of the group as an entity to work its will-and her
conduct might seem inconsistent with the acceptance of group representation").
216. Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at 1165-66.
217. Id. at 1169.
218. White, "Democracy" In Development Practice, supra note 161, at 1086.
219. See Marshall, supra note 136, at 221-22.
220. Id; cf Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to
Low-Income Persons, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751, 1756-57 (1999) (Recommendations
10 and 16 , arguing that once representation begins, group/community conflicts gener-
ally should be resolved in favor of the group client subject to limitations described in
retainer).
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IV. THE DEMOCRATIC MAELSTROM: SHELTER
FROM THE STORM
In beginning this article, we sought to examine the concept of
participatory democracy as it relates to decision making in commu-
nity groups. In particular, we were interested in the relationship
between the participatory ideal, the success of community groups,
and the legitimacy of their leaders. In Section I, we recounted two
stories that described very different, but not uncommon, difficul-
ties in group dynamics. They involved the problem of autocratic
leadership and the absence of meaningful membership participa-
tion in decision making. The groups and their members had dis-
similar responses to the incursions on the democratic process by
their leaders. These differences highlight important, but neglected,
questions about the correlation between participation and success
(as defined by the groups, themselves). In this section we address
the "groupness" of the assemblages of people described in our two
narratives and discuss some of the significant differences between
them. We hope to reach some conclusions about the role of law-
yers in reference to the problems presented and about the relation-
ship of democracy to the legal representation of groups in a
community setting. Finally, we address the lack of effective gui-
dance provided by the Model Rules for lawyers engaged in a com-
munity practice of the sort we envision and suggest a starting point
for re-examining professional conduct in this practice setting.
A. Groupness in Context
Earlier, we examined the nature of groups and the factors that
set them apart from mere aggregations of individuals.221 We
pointed out that while there is no universally accepted definition of
a "group," most commentators believe that certain elements must
be present before an aggregation may be properly so described.222
We then described different types of groups and some of the fac-
tors-such as self-identity, identification by others, the social and
governance structure (or its absence) of a group, the interdepen-
dence of its membership and the goals (whether expressive or in-
strumental) of a group-that help to define them. 223
We went on to discuss some of the characteristics of leadership,
followership and free-riding.224 In distinguishing between leader-
221. See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
222. See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 37-65 and accompanying text.
224. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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ship and dominance and between formal and emergent leadership,
we attempted to describe the nature of leadership and the relation-
ship between leaders and followers, including why people join
groups and why people become leaders.225 We pointed out that
within the concept of followership, there is a complex and dynamic
interaction between the parties, with several opportunities for role
transitions and defection.226 Followership was distinguished from
free riding or social loafing and we examined the effect of these
phenomena on group dynamics and legitimacy on the role of a
lawyer.227
In an effort to refine the meaning of "group" and of "leadership/
followership," we will apply some of the concepts and theories
about groups, leaders and followers to the associations that we por-
trayed in our narratives. We will then examine some of the less
obvious political issues that confront lawyers who represent such
groups. Finally, we will suggest a more nuanced prescription of the
role of lawyers in such representation.
The two associations of residents that we depicted had, accord-
ing to most definitions, several elements of groupness. They each
involved, to one degree or another, a set of face-to-face interac-
tions around essentially common goals. In Arabella's case, re-
sidents sought to obtain a payment for their agreement to vacate
their building.228 In the cooperative situation, the residents sought
to own and maintain affordable housing on a cooperative basis.229
While the cooperative was more formally structured than Ara-
bella's group, each had a certain structure that residents recognized
and accepted or, at least, in which they acquiesced. In each case,
participants recognized themselves as members of a group and out-
siders who observed them also identified them as members.
These aggregations also exhibited several elements that sug-
gested the absence of groupness. For example, Arabella controlled
both the agenda for her organization and its activities, resulting in
almost no interdependence of task among the residents.23 ° In the
cooperative, what began as a truly interdependent undertaking de-
teriorated (as far as groupness is concerned) into an autocracy con-
trolled by Ms. Johnson. 231 A role transition 232 took place as
225. See discussion supra Part II.C.
226. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
227. See discussion supra Part II.C.3; see also discussion supra Part III.A.
228. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
230. See discussion supra Part I.B.
231. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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members began to seek opportunities to exit the cooperative.
While outsiders still viewed residents as members of the group, the
residents' self-identification as group members became weaker.
Resentments arose against Ms. Johnson but most residents seemed
to believe it would be easier to move out rather than to oppose her
leadership. Residents began to think of themselves as powerless-
as if they were tenants rather than owners.
The instrumental goals of the cooperative were failing at the
same time the expressive goals were dying. The property was fall-
ing into disrepair and its funds were being diverted to non-cooper-
ative purposes. The residents were losing the benefits of decent
and affordable housing while the neighborhood was losing the ben-
efits of an effective community institution. If one believes that
community groups should be vehicles that contribute to achieving
some commonly accepted goal, regardless of whether they involve
member participation, one could question whether this once vi-
brant cooperative could continue to be called a group.
B. Leadership, Dominance, and Manipulation
Questions involving the existence of a group necessarily involve
questions about its leadership. In the two situations we have ex-
amined, a comparison of their leadership with the idealized demo-
cratic model produces a series of ambiguities and contradictions.
Clearly, Arabella and Ms. Johnson dominated the decision-making
process of their respective organizations. There was little or no
member participation in either group. Indeed, in the cooperative,
there were signs of disaffection and dissociation. Can Ms. Johnson
and Arabella be called leaders without resorting to a domination-
based criterion?
1. Arabella, a Flawed Leader
Arabella is an example of the so-called emergent leader.2 3
3
While she assumed the title of president of the tenants' association,
she had not been elected to the position. She succeeded to leader-
ship upon the death of her father, the founder and long time leader
of the group. During his tenure, the residents waged an ongoing
struggle with the owner of their building to improve conditions and
to reduce rents. When the founder died, several pieces of litigation
were pending between the parties. Conditions had not dramati-
232. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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cally improved during the struggle and many tenants had left the
building and their units had not been re-rented by the owner.
Upon his death, Arabella sought to continue her father's work and
propelled herself into the leadership role.
Her efforts were not outwardly opposed by any member. There
are several possible explanations for this acquiescence. As we pre-
viously mentioned, Arabella was intelligent, articulate and pro-
fessed to have the members' best interests at heart.2 34 She had the
available time and resources to undertake the role and the energy
to perform it.235 Other members did not have Arabella's talents,
resources or energy. They believed she would protect their inter-
ests and fight for them.
During her tenure, the goals of the group changed.236 It no
longer fought to improve building maintenance.237 It now fought
to extract the largest possible payoff from the owner in exchange
for its members vacating the building.238 Interestingly, it is not
clear who initiated this change of direction nor how it was adopted
by the membership. In hindsight, one could surmise that Arabella
had a hidden agenda 239 of personal enrichment and either dictated
or manipulated the change of direction for her own benefit. Nev-
ertheless, she aggressively maintained the various suits with the
owners, largely on a pro se basis, while she sought a financial set-
tlement with them. She assumed that the cost of the litigation, to-
gether with the legitimate possibility that the tenants would
prevail, would push the owners into a satisfactory payment to the
tenants.
Why did Arabella seek her leadership position? There are sev-
eral possible, non-mutually exclusive answers. On the most gener-
ous level, Arabella might really have had the best interests of the
members at heart. She might have seen herself as offering the best
chance of their achieving their goals. Another possibility is that
she saw it as her obligation, or her challenge, based on her father's
position of prominence in the building and in the group. Further,
she might have believed that other residents would not take on the
tasks of leading the group.240 Less generously, she might have seen
leadership as an opportunity to advance her personal agenda con-
234. See discussion supra Part I.B.
235. See discussion supra Part I.B.
236. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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cerning status or career. On the least generous level, she might
have seen the leadership position as offering the possibility for ac-
quiring a significant and disproportionately larger share of any set-
tlement, the result that ultimately came to pass.241
Whatever her motivations, she assumed effective control of the
group. Other members did not object and seemed willing to allow
Arabella to take and to continue to hold the role. They accepted
her strategic decisions and may have accepted her decisions about
goals. They essentially left everything to her and, while members
met periodically, the purpose of the meetings was generally that
Arabella could update them and tell them what she had decided to
do. At some of the meetings, Arabella asked for, and received,
confirmatory votes from the membership.242 Ultimately, when
challenged about the size of the bonus she allocated to herself, Ar-
abella responded that the members had approved it at a meeting
during which the bonus had been disclosed.243
The motivations of the members in permitting Arabella to act
without supervision, accountability or feedback are also unclear.
They may have believed that Arabella was, in fact, an effective
spokesperson and advocate for their position. They may have
trusted her and agreed with her actions as disclosed at the periodic
meetings that were held. Alternatively, they might have thought
that she was the most capable person to assist them in attaining
their goals. Her education, language skills and aggressiveness
might have been seen as important assets in their struggle, assets
that could not be replicated by the other members. Finally, they
might have determined that allowing Arabella to lead and act for
them gave them a good chance of obtaining some benefit without
241. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
242. It should be noted that many members who voted to confirm her decisions did
so without understanding the decisions or their implications. This was due to a variety
of obstacles including language difficulties among the membership (there were at
least five different primary languages represented among the members), limited edu-
cational backgrounds and lack of interest in the details (as opposed to the results) of
the members' struggle.
243. When the membership was questioned about this approval, approximately half
of those questioned (which only comprised about a quarter of the total membership)
said they did not know of the bonus and would not have approved had they known.
Of the other members who were questioned, about half said they knew there was a
bonus but understood it to be approximately $3,500 rather than the ultimate $114,000
Arabella had allocated to herself. They approved the smaller number but would not
have approved the larger number had they understood its magnitude. The remaining
members both knew of the magnitude of the allocated bonus and approved of it.
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putting forth any significant effort of their own. In other words,
they might have made the decision to free ride.244
Whatever the motivations, the group functioned in apparent har-
mony while the struggle to obtain a satisfactory settlement contin-
ued. When a tentative deal was struck, however, the harmony gave
way to overt bickering and accusations of usurpation and fraud.
The followers, who had left Arabella largely on her own through-
out the dispute, began contesting her decisions when they learned
of her self-allocated bonus. People who had been inactive sud-
denly came forward forcefully and articulately to complain about
her tactics and about her distribution scheme. The show of asser-
tiveness at this juncture bolsters the possibility that many members
may have been free riding on Arabella's efforts.
2. Ms. Johnson: The Descent to Despotism
Ms. Johnson was a different kind of leader. She was a partici-
pant in a formal group 245 and was elected president of the coopera-
tive according to formal procedures. Almost from the beginning of
her tenure, however, Ms. Johnson began the dismantling of the co-
operative's procedural and administrative structure. She amended
the by-laws without a proper meeting or membership vote.246 The
amendment purported to increase her term of office beyond what
was permissible under local law. She began making decisions that
bound the cooperative without the approval (or even the knowl-
edge) of its board of directors. Eventually, after having digested a
steady diet of autocratic decisions (without any contrition by Ms.
Johnson), board members resigned or simply stopped participating
in the cooperative's affairs.
As in the Arabella narrative, Ms. Johnson's motivations are un-
clear. She might have acted out of bitterness for her earlier rejec-
tion by the cooperative's members or because she saw an
opportunity for personal profit. It is conceivable, but unlikely, that
she thought she could improve the position of the cooperative
through her leadership. In any event, her actions caused the dete-
rioration of the cooperative and of the building it owned.
In this situation, it is less likely that Ms. Johnson could be called
a leader.247 There came a time when she clearly did not have the
244. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
247. Recall discussion of leadership supra note 90-97 and accompanying text.
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support of a majority of the membership 248 but the members gave
up rather than struggle to unseat her.249 Ms. Johnson did not seem
to utilize overt coercion to achieve her dominance but the force
and aggressiveness of her personality may have dissuaded mem-
bers from active dissent. Many of those who could leave did so,
using the tactic of exit to protect their interest.250 Those who could
not exit because of the difficult local housing market, cut their
loses by directing their time and energy to other activities. That
strategy was only partially successful, however, because they con-
tinued to be negatively impacted by Ms. Johnson's actions.
C. A Short Typology of Groups
In Arabella's tenant association, by the time the lawyer became
involved, the residents' purpose had shifted from a long-term fight
with the building's owner over conditions and rents to a more nar-
rowly focused attempt to obtain the largest possible financial set-
tlement in exchange for the tenants vacating the building. The
residents had no real organizational structure and Arabella had
merely assumed leadership after the death of her father. Arabella
ran the group manipulatively and autocratically, although she did
give a superficial nod to participatory democracy. Nevertheless,
the residents succeeded in obtaining a large amount of money to
settle the various disputes with the owner and to vacate the
building.
This is in contrast to the housing cooperative where there was no
single event in the group's existence to which members could point
and say that they had accomplished their purpose and could dis-
band. The group's purpose was to provide cooperative housing in-
definitely into the future. The cooperative had formal procedures
in place which had been followed, with significant participation by
the membership, for some time. In fact, Ms. Johnson, the coopera-
tive's president, had been duly elected under those procedures.
Once in office, however, Ms. Johnson discarded those procedures
and ruled autocratically and despotically. Members of the group
ceased to participate and at least part of the goal of the organiza-
tion, cooperation and participation among members, was lost. It
also appears that another of the goals, the provision of decent and
affordable housing, is in jeopardy.
248. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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1. Value-added by Participation
Groups are formed for several purposes. These purposes may be
instrumental,25' that is, leading to a particular, concrete goal, or
they may be expressive 252 by providing a vehicle for members to
grow personally and by increasing their feeling of belonging and of
self-worth. Often these purposes coincide in a single group. The
expressive purpose is often enhanced by the participation of mem-
bers in a reciprocal and democratic manner. But do all groups seek
expressive outlets? The answer to this question may depend on
whether the group has a finite goal that will be accomplished over
a short time span or whether it has multiple goals, including its own
continued existence.
a. Democracy and One-shot Groups
The purpose of a one-shot group is almost always instrumen-
tal.253 If a group has a single goal, it typically disbands when it has
reached that goal. While expressive aspects may be present in such
groups, such aspects usually surface only incidentally in the pursuit
of the group's instrumental goal.
In the Arabella group context, how would group member benefit
from democratic participation? Three discrete possibilities leap to
mind: the choice of group goals, the choice of a leader, and in the
approval of the proposed settlement. Yet it is conceivable that
democratic participation would be detrimental to the instrumental
purpose of the group were it to have been employed in other areas.
Goal setting, for example, would seem to be a crucial point for
member participation. On closer examination, however, participa-
tion may be less compelling than it appears at first blush. Assume
an individual identifies a problem and seeks to involve others in
attempting to rectify it. As the individual publicizes the problem
and solicits participation, potential participants will evaluate, first,
whether they really perceive a problem of the sort the individual
describes and, second, whether the problem negatively affects
them in a serious way. If a potential participant determines there is
not a problem of the sort suggested or, even if there is, that she is
not seriously affected by it, she will not join the group. On the
other hand, if potential participants recognize a problem that seri-
ously effects them, they will engage in a cost-benefit analysis to
251. See supra note 54-56 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 54-56 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 64.
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determine how much they will be willing to contribute to resolving
the problem.25 4
If their analysis is classically rational, part of the calculation will
be to determine whether they can count on someone else to carry
the load in pursuing a satisfactory result and, if so, the likelihood of
that person's success without a major contribution from them.2 5 5 If
they decide that they are best served by letting others, perhaps the
convening individual, pursue a remedy, they will join the group,
support its existence and its goal but acquiesce in another's leader-
ship and agenda setting. In the typical situation, they will allow the
leader to determine the method of achieving the goal.
If this analysis is plausible, it suggests that a goal is accepted
merely if a potential member joins a one-shot group. It is then
entirely conceivable that the leadership of such a group would be
supported because of the benefits of free riding by constituents or,
in some cases, due to a loosely constructed followership. That
would leave only one area where participation remains central to
group needs: the identification of a successful outcome. Here the
members must determine whether the benefit to the group and,
perhaps, derivatively to each member (we will address this latter
point shortly), is sufficient for them to give up their individual
claims or grievances. Even here, there is a subtly coercive feature
(in the nature of a prisoner's dilemma) that pushes the group to
accept a result that the leader thinks is adequate even though many
members may disagree. Assume no other members have contrib-
uted significantly to achieving the outcome. In that case, if the
group rejects a proposal negotiated and recommended by the
leader, there is the risk that the leader will cease her efforts and no
one else will step in to the leadership position. This would mean
that no benefit would be forthcoming if the proposed settlement is
rejected, even though some members may believe it is inadequate.
Other areas of group activity might be more efficiently con-
ducted without the norm of democratic participation even being an
issue. This is particularly likely when the decisions involved do not
address significant policy concerns. Thus, strategic decisions that
might be made by a lawyer, for example, under Model Rule 1.2,256
might be made with equal legitimacy in the group context by the
leader. To the extent the decisions do not stray too far from what
254. See discussion on free riding, supra Part II.C.3.
255. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
256. Model Rule 1.2 defines the Scope of Representation. See supra note 198 and
accompanying text.
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members would find acceptable, the members who tend toward
free riding will not intervene. 57 In fact, long discussions about
strategies might prolong the process of settlement and produce in-
ternal strife and factionalization among the members.
b. Formal Procedures, Longevity, and Democratic Participation
The narrative about the housing cooperative describes a group
with very different needs. The group's goals were both instrumen-
tal, providing decent and affordable housing, and expressive, al-
lowing members to feel a sense of belonging and of self-worth.
Indeed, there is a perceived symbiosis between those goals, as a
greater sense of belonging will result in higher quality housing at
lower costs. 258 Because of this, the procedures of cooperatives are
specifically designed to encourage participation and interaction.259
When Ms. Johnson was chosen as the president of the coopera-
tive, there was no cause for concern about the participatory pro-
cess. Once in office, however, Ms. Johnson soon showed herself
not only to be insensitive to the participatory ideals of cooperatives
but also to be an autocratic and exclusionary leader. She estab-
lished new procedures by fiat that contradicted the spirit of the
cooperative movement and violated that particular cooperative's
bylaws as well as provisions of local law.2 60 In contrast with Ara-
bella's case, the absence of a participatory process demonstrably
undermined the goals of the cooperative group. Members exited,
either physically or psychologically, and the cohesiveness of the
group and financial well-being of the building deteriorated. The
attorney's failure to challenge Ms. Johnson's actions, at least to
bring their impropriety to the attention of the board, contributed
to that deterioration.
257. If the member is a free rider, she has already determined that the benefits to
be derived do not warrant her involvement, particularly since someone else is per-
forming the essential activities. Even in followership situations, the relationship, al-
though fluid, is one in which the followers remain relatively quiescent in the absence
of a strong stimulus to become active.
258. HOUSING-THE COOPERATIVE WAY 89 (Jerome Liblit ed., 1964); see RUTH
H. LANDMAN, CREATING COMMUNITY IN THE CITY: COOPERATIVES AND COMMU-
NITY GARDENS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 81-96 (1993) (extolling the benefits of
cooperatives).
259. LANDMAN, supra note 258, at 83-96.
260. The new procedures had the effect of entrenching Ms. Johnson in power and
giving her a broad scope of authority to take action that was previously reserved to
the cooperative's board of directors or membership. See supra notes 32-33 and ac-
companying text.
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2. Lawyers, Group Clients, and the Significance of
Democratic Participation
As we have seen, situations arise in which a community group
operates solely on the strength of its leadership and without any
significant participation from its members. How should a lawyer
who represents such a group deal with the absence of a democratic,
participatory process? The answer may depend on the nature of
the group, its membership composition and its purposes as well as
on the relative priority the attorney places on democratic proce-
dures.261 In the next two sections, we will address some of the is-
sues raised by our narratives and attempt to refine the paradigm of
a lawyer's representation of a group client.
a. One-shot Groups, Instrumental Goals and
Democratic Participation
As the previous discussion about the Arabella group suggests, in
the absence of a desire by members for democratic participation,
the lack of a democratic process may not be, in and of itself, a
serious problem. This is true regardless of whether the group made
an autonomous and informed choice to cede authority to its leader-
ship or whether such authority arose as the result of passive acqui-
escence. Thus, after being convinced that democratic participation
is not a high priority of the group members and such participation
would not necessarily enhance the group's ability to achieve its
goal, we believe that a lawyer should not insist on democratic par-
ticipation as a condition of taking on the representation. Nor
should a lawyer attempt to foist such a model on her client to fur-
ther the lawyer's sense of appropriate procedures. 62
Arabella's case presented an additional complexity beyond the
lack of a participatory process. Arabella seemed to have pursued
her own "hidden agenda" in seeking to appropriate a dispropor-
tionately large share of any settlement proceeds for her personal
benefit. Determining what would be an appropriate response to
this situation by the group's attorney is not as clear as one might
261. See, for example, Ellmann's discussion of the importance of democratic proce-
dures as an end in and of themselves. Ellmann, Client-Centeredness, supra note 8, at
1152-53 (discussing the lawyer's responsibilities if the leader starts to employ methods
with fall "beneath a baseline threshold of democratic fairness").
262. This does not prevent the lawyer from raising and discussing the advantages or
disadvantages of such a model with the client. We merely suggest that the lawyer
should not insist on this model nor, of course, contrary to Ellmann's position, should




suspect. If Arabella's desire to lead was opportunistic, it is possible
that removing the rewards of leadership, assuming this could be
accomplished, would cause her to abandon her instrumental role.
Recall that no one else in the group was prepared to take on the
leadership role. In this particular group, it is also likely that none
of the other residents would have been as effective as Arabella in
pursuing the group's goals because of language, educational, finan-
cial and citizenship limitations. Therefore, even an attorney who
highly valued democratic participation and altruistic leadership
might be forced to accept an autocratic manipulator in order to
preserve the possibility of a satisfactory substantive outcome for
the group.
There is a third possibility. Upon being convinced of Arabella's
hidden agenda, the unlikelihood of dissuading her from attempting
to divert benefits that could go to members, and the dissatisfaction
of a majority of the group with such a diversion, the attorney could
conceivably assume Arabella's leadership role. If the group is pri-
marily concerned with the most materially beneficial outcome it
can achieve, and is not devoted to internal leadership, one might
argue that the attorney should assist the members in deposing the
manipulative leader and to take on her responsibilities. Remem-
ber that this is a one-shot group. Its goals are instrumental and not
expressive. After the goal is reached, the group will disband and
disperse.263 The lawyer would have helped the client and its con-
stituency to achieve the desired outcome by stepping out of the
lawyer/client and participatory paradigms, arguably without doing
harm (except in the most abstract way) to either.2 4
Several problems are raised by this third option. One is that the
lawyer is often an outsider without inherent credentials for a lead-
ership role within the group. On the other hand, this obstacle
might be overcome by a lawyer who sees herself as a participant in
community action and who is seen by community residents as com-
263. An argument against such an action by the attorney is that it deprives the
membership of the long-term capacity-building benefits of participating in the pro-
cess. Even if this group does not require such participation, the experience of having
participated could enhance the member's capacity to participate which would, in turn,
strengthen the next group those members join.
264. The lawyer, by intervening, has not usurped power from any legitimate holder
of power nor has the lawyer short circuited an asset-marshaling process to create and
utilize power. The power that was built has already been utilized to extract a large
payment from an owner who resisted the tenants efforts to improve conditions. Since
the settlement required the tenants to vacate the building (an action they were willing
to take in exchange for compensation) and their subsequent dispersal, there was no
ongoing institution that was upset by the lawyer's action.
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mitted to their well-being. 65 Another concern is the possible
short-circuiting of capacity building among existing group mem-
bers. Even though a group is a one-shot organization, the group's
members may not be one-shot players. They are likely to continue
to reside in the community and may be involved in additional com-
munity struggles. The benefit of a member's participation or com-
mand of a leadership position might carry over to the next group
and to the one after that.
In Arabella's case, the empirical evidence seems to point in a
different direction. No other member sought leadership. Each
seemed to be content with Arabella carrying the load, at least until
a group-wide result was achieved. This is true despite the fact that
several people had sufficient ambition and skill to challenge Ara-
bella when the size of her bonus became clear to the membership.
It is unclear whether those individuals had previously remained in
the background due to free-riding or due to action by Arabella that
was intended to keep them at bay. It is certainly conceivable that
these members had a well-developed sense of self-entitlement
while not having as well-developed sense of strategic planning and
action. Thus, if the lawyer and members had become aware earlier
of Arabella's hidden agenda and that they could not deter her from
pursuing it, the lawyer might justifiably assist in deposing her. The
lawyer's first priority must then be to secure new leaders who
should come from among the membership, if at all possible. If it is
not possible, the lawyer may have to assume leadership.
If the lawyer and group become aware of the hidden agenda af-
ter a group-wide result has been achieved (e.g. a lump sum settle-
ment to be divided by the group members), the lawyer's role is
quite different. Then she must assist the group in establishing a
process for the allocation of the group-wide benefit among the
membership. In order to enhance the possibility of procedural and
substantive fairness and the possibility of acceptance by members,
the process must be participatory among those affected. There
must be participation both in the creation of the process and in the
allocation of benefits. The lawyer should not assume a leadership
position here although she may counsel the members on the exis-
tence of various procedures and allocation schemes.
265. See LOPEZ, supra note 7, at 50-51; Diamond, supra note 9, at 73 (stating that
lawyers should "participate in a client's activities in more central ways, such as or-
ganizing the group and participating in its political actions").
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b. Ongoing Groups, Democracy, and the
Expressive/Instrumental Mix
Different issues are presented by the story about the coopera-
tive. Given the apparent malfunctioning of the cooperative's
board and the impermissible actions taken by Ms. Johnson, the
lawyer needs to decide whether intervention is proper and, if so,
how to proceed. The Model Rules do not provide much guidance
on this issue (a subject to which we will return shortly). A lawyer
representing a group client is to follow the dictates of the group's
identified decision makers.266 If a lawyer cannot in conscience do
so, the Rules allow a lawyer to withdraw from the representation in
certain circumstances. 67 Beyond this, the lawyer is on her own.
Thus, the lawyer's appropriate response in this situation appears
superficially easy. The issue is whether there is, in fact, a legitimate
decision maker. Normally, the lawyer should have called the ille-
galities to the attention of the board but it is unclear that the board
or the membership was functioning. These bodies had certainly
not addressed Ms. Johnson's usurpations in the past. The lawyer's
role, therefore, might be to go further than merely informing the
proper corporate functionaries. The lawyer might need to inter-
vene to restore the democratic model with which the group began.
We take this position for two reasons. First our view is that the
lawyer is not (or at least should not be) a neutral bystander in com-
munity group representation. 68 The lawyer should participate in
group planning and decision making so long as she does not at-
tempt to dominate the group. The second reason is because, in this
case, the group's ability to further its goals is in serious doubt with-
out that intervention. Given a lawyer who sees community im-
provement as her professional calling, standing on the niceties of
professional distance and client-centered aloofness removes the
lawyer from the political and practical realities of the situation.269
Here, it is not only the procedural issue of Ms. Johnson's elimina-
tion of democratic participation that should activate the lawyer's
intervention, but also the lawyer should act to help preserve insti-
266. See ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 3 (1998) (noting
that "[w]hen constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordi-
narily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful").
267. Id. R. 1.16(b).
268. See Diamond, supra note 9, at 121-23 (advocating a proactive role for the com-
munity lawyer that acknowledges the lawyer's autonomy as well as the group's
autonomy).
269. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
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tutions of community power that are being diverted from their
original course by rogue leaders.
The members of the cooperative had originally come together to
create a tenant owned and operated building. This institution of
community strength has value both practically through the provi-
sion of decent, affordable housing and symbolically as a standard
bearer for the possibility of organization and the benefits to be de-
rived from it. In many cases, such an institution is an anchor for
the entire neighborhood. The lawyer who is committed to the
community may act to prevent such institutions from being de-
stroyed by autocracy. When the lawyer can argue in good con-
science that the leadership of a group that she represents is
illegitimate, the lawyer has, in our view, a duty to respond to the
situation.
How should a lawyer intervene? This is a more difficult question
because it is tied not to doctrinal or even theoretical models of
behavior but to the individual psyche of each lawyer. Some will
confront the leader on a bare-knuckled political basis. Other will
use technical legal devices to proceed or involve outside stakehold-
ers. What is clear, however, is that the membership must be
brought back into the struggle. Without the members, the institu-
tion is devoid of content and bereft of meaning. Without interven-
tion by the attorney, the group and the benefits it confers will be
severely diminished or lost.
D. Ethical Guidance for Community Lawyers
In Part III, we discussed several situations of group representa-
tion in which the Model Rules either failed to provide any gui-
dance to lawyers or where the guidance was designed to apply to a
very different context from the community practice we de-
scribed. 270 This failing leaves lawyers to extrapolate from the ex-
isting rules in order to choose an appropriate course of action.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to construct an alterna-
tive model of professional conduct for the community lawyer, we
do have some thoughts that might provide a starting point for that
endeavor.
Before suggesting any points for rethinking ethical conduct, we
wish to emphasize our belief that the nature of practice in a com-
munity setting is different from traditional concepts of practice.
Moreover, we believe that such practice should be different from
270. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
COMMUNITY LAWYER'S DILEMMA
traditional practice. Therefore, we believe that a new body of ethi-
cal rules ought be added to the existing body in order to address
more directly the kinds of issues that often arise in a community
practice but do not usually arise in the standard litigation or trans-
actional practice.
In approaching the question of which ethical rules should govern
lawyers representing community groups, we start from three gen-
eral propositions. First, the lawyer must be able to play an active
role in the deliberations of the organization. Second, her actions
should be directed towards realizing the goals of the organization.
And third, the nature and extent of the lawyer's role will vary de-
pending on the nature of the group and its leadership/followership
dynamic. With those general propositions in mind, we suggest sev-
eral factors for consideration in developing a modified set of ethi-
cal rules that are appropriate to a community practice.
Part of the lawyer's dilemma is resolving the traditional question
of who the client is. As we discussed in Part II, the sociological
literature has identified several characteristics of groups that are
essential to understanding how they function and, correspondingly,
how outsiders might interact with them.271 Many of those charac-
teristics relate to the concept of "groupness." Groups exhibit dif-
ferent degrees of groupness depending on factors such as the
members' common fate, level of interaction, self-definition, and in-
terdependence. 72 A lawyer who represents a collection of people
that exhibits a high degree of groupness may be better able to as-
certain and pursue the group's objectives, while a lawyer who rep-
resents a loosely affiliated aggregation may need to pay greater
attention to the interests of individual members. But even this ad-
monition does not suggest a fixed rule because groups are dy-
namic-the degree of groupness may vary over time, over subsets
of members, and in relation to different objectives which means
that the lawyer's obligation may also vary.
Another critical factor is the legitimacy of the leadership. Lead-
ership is not, despite the direct but mechanical configuration of the
Model Rules, simply a question of finding a "duly authorized con-
stituent. '273 Leaders can obtain their position through formal or
informal mechanisms, and regardless of the mechanism, they can
exhibit a wide range of legitimacy. The community lawyer must
constantly evaluate the legitimacy of leaders, a task that can often
271. See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
272. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
273. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (1998).
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be achieved only through close interaction with group members
and careful examination of leader/follower dynamics. As a general
matter, the weaker the legitimacy of a group's leader, the more
appropriate intervention by the lawyer may become. Even that
formulation, however, presents problems. Where a group is largely
populated by free riders, or where members do not strongly iden-
tify themselves with the group, intervention that unseats even a
weak leader may lead to a vacuum that results in the death of the
organization and its goals. Is a bad leader worse than no leader?
That may depend on whether the group has a one-shot, instrumen-
tal goal or a multi-faceted set of goals that include both expressive
and instrumental aspects.
A lawyer must also take into consideration the alternative mech-
anisms of accountability that are present in a group when deciding
whether, when and how to intervene. There may be internal char-
acteristics, such as the ease of exit, or the presence of other stake-
holders, that impact decision making. If a lawyer fails to consider
those factors, she may embark on an unnecessary or, worse,
counterproductive course of action.
Finally, all of theses factors must be weighed in light of the
objectives of the group. That proposition, however, raises as many
questions as it answers, given that the lawyer's ability to assess the
objectives of a group will be directly affected by the legitimacy of
leadership and the degree of groupness. The presence of a demo-
cratic process may not be necessary to a group's objective goals,
but how can a lawyer know the group's objectives in the absence of
a democratic process? While this is not an inescapable conundrum,
it should not be dismissed lightly.
We contend that there is a need to fashion ethical rules for law-
yers who are more actively involved in their clients' activities
where the clients do not conform to the well-organized, formally
hierarchical groups to which the Model Rules seem to be directed.
In addition to the difference in structure, the activities and goals of
the clients may be quite different from the discrete legal tasks envi-
sioned by the drafters of the Model Rules. We believe the ethical
rules must recognize that there are differences in clients and in
practices. These differences require the recognition of a different
kind of lawyer-client relationship, one that goes deeper than the
provisions of Model Rule 2.1.274 This welcome expansion of a law-
yer's scope of consideration is, nevertheless, not sufficient when it
274. Model Rule 2.1 permits lawyers to consider the "moral, economic, social and
political factors" in matter. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1998).
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is often these very factors that are the heart of the client's claim
and the center of the lawyer's representation.
V. CONCLUSION
Commentators discuss the need for organizing residents of poor
communities in order to combat the poverty and injustice that they
constantly confront. The benefits of organization include the ac-
quisition of power that is to be used against the sources of oppres-
sion. The ideal of these organizations is that they are run on
democratic principles with leaders that are duly elected or who
emerge with the affirmative acceptance of the membership. We
have seen in this article that the reality does not always conform to
the ideal.
Many of the commentators who call for collective action by dis-
empowered groups also discuss the need for, and the part to be
played by, progressive lawyers who will represent the groups. The
paramount role is the creation or maintenance of democratic pro-
cedures in these groups by a lawyer who adopts, on the whole, the
group's substantive choices without significant participation by the
lawyer in those choices. Moreover, this same commentary offers
uncritical endorsement to the application of the democratic ideal to
community groups.
We believe that a critical examination of the differences in
groups and in their leadership will suggest different models of gov-
ernance in different situations. There is no one-size-fits-all system
that should be imposed on every group. It is our view that a lawyer
should take a more participatory role in substantive decision mak-
ing by group clients. To the extent a lawyer is committed to social
change based on mobilizations of residents in poor neighborhoods,
the lawyer must be prepared to expand her own horizons in terms
of what she can do to assist in these efforts. The process between
client and lawyer in these circumstances should be interactive and
multi-disciplinary. In this way, the law and its practitioners can be
effective in the struggle against poverty, subordination and
injustice.
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